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What is "(Im)partial Enough" in a World of Embedded
Neutrals*
By Nancy A. Welsh**

The Supreme Court's decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co. highlightedthefragility ofjudicial independence and
impartialityin the United States. A similar,less-noticedfragility of
independence and impartialityexists among the arbitrators,
mediators and administrativehearing officers who resolve an
increasingnumber of disputes. Everywhere one looks, there is
unremarkedyet remarkableevidence of the rise of "embedded
neutrals,"particularlyin uneven contexts between one-time and
repeatplayers. This phenomenon becomes particularlyworrisome
when the embedded neutral'srole is due to their special relationship
with the repeatplayer, and the one-time player is not as sophisticated
as the repeatplayer, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen the
dispute resolutionforum that will be used to resolve theirdispute,
and is either unaware of the special relationshipbetween the neutral
and the repeatplayer or effectively unable to challenge it. As dispute
resolution becomes a lucrativeprivate business, it is easy to begin to
worry about the corrupting influence of repeat business and money
on the ability of embedded neutrals to "holdthe balance nice, clear
and true." The Supreme Court, however, seems largely oblivious to
these concerns. The Court has encourageddeference to the decisions
andsettlement agreements these neutralsproduce and has regularly
rejected one-time players' claims ofstructuralbias. This Article
explores whether the analysis in Caperton and its antecedents - i.e.,
conducting a close examination of the volume andflow of monies
that may provide direct and indirect benefit to the neutral,their
timing, and the plausibility of their effect on an adjudicatedoutcome,
in order to determine whether the risk of actual bias is "too high" to
be deemed "constitutionallytolerable" - could be applied to assess
the sufficiency of the impartialityoffered by embedded neutrals and
private dispute resolution organizationswhen they are treated as
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adequate - and sometimes superior- replacementsfor independent

andpublic trialcourts.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court took the extraordinary measure
of announcing that West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice
Brent Benjamin had violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when he refused to recuse himself in
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.' Writing on behalf of a majority of
the Court, Justice Kennedy detailed the nearly $3 million in
campaign contributions that had been directed to Justice Benjamin's

*This article was originally published by the University of Arizona Law
Review, and can be located at 52 ARIz. L. REv. 395 (2010). J. NAALJ obtained
permission to reprint this article both from the University of Arizona Law Review
and the author.
** Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University. My thanks to the following current and former students for their
research assistance with portions of this Article, which has been in gestation for a
very long time: Carolina Aguilar, Lauren Avallone, Christopher Demetriou, Amy
Fernandez, Jen Modjeska, Linas Ledebur, Emily Munn, Frank Pyle, Anthony
Rodgers, Kelly Towns, and Travis White. My thanks also go to the following
persons for their comments on drafts and early presentations of the article: Larry
Backer, Ray Campbell, Tom Carbonneau, Jamie Colburn, Lance Cole, Katrice
Bridges Copeland, Michael Foreman, Chris Honeyman, Eileen Kane, Kit Kinports,
Bobbi McAdoo, Greg McNeal, Bruce Meyerson, Carla Pratt, Richard Reuben,
Catherine Rogers, Andrea Schneider, Jeff Stempel, Jean Sternlight, Laurel Terry,
Carl Ver Beek, and Shoba Wadhia. My thanks to Penn State University, Dickinson
School of Law for summer research stipends and the funds to employ the many
research assistants listed supra. And thanks to the following organizations and
institutions that provided me with opportunities to present and receive feedback on
earlier iterations of this Article: Tilburg University; Marquette University School of
Law; University of Nevada-Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law; Northern
California ADR Faculty Conference at Stanford Law School; AALS ADR
Section's Works-in-Progress Workshop at Arizona State University, Sandra Day
O'Connor College of Law; Hamline University School of Law; Hofstra University
School of Law; and University of Maryland School of Law. Finally, and as always,
my thanks and love go to my wonderful and witty husband, Eric Munck, and our
sons, Sean and Daniel, who constantly manage to bring humor, affection, and new
discoveries to life in our Zits-like home.
1129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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campaign by defendant A. T. Massey's board chairman and principal
officer, Don Blankenship, the "temporal" relationship among these
contributions, Justice Benjamin's electoral victory, and the central
role that he played in two decisions that reversed a $50 million jury
verdict against Massey. 2 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded
that the situation in this case presented "too high" a risk of actual bias
to be deemed "constitutionally tolerable."3
With its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the exceptionalism
of, and public respect for, the independence and impartiality of
America's judges. The decision challenged some citizens' perception
that judges can be unduly influenced by those with money and
power.' Such suspicion resonates in the press coverage of a variety of
relatively recent events involving the Supreme Court: its decision in
Bush v. Gore,5 Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself in Cheney v.
U.S. District Courtfor the Districtof Columbia,6 and even the
nomination of Harriet Miers for the Supreme Court.
The press itself, of course, is not immune to accusations of undue
influence. Indeed, during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq,
American citizens were introduced to the concept of the "embedded
journalist."7 Pentagon officials claimed that they were limiting
journalists' access in order to ensure their safety and protect secret
military operations, but the officials also must have been aware that
the journalists' reporting would be influenced by what the military
permitted them to see and how the military framed these events.
A similar dynamic is also occurring within the ranks of the
neutrals who assist with the resolution of many legal disputes - e.g.,
Id. at 2256-60.
3Id. at 2257.
4 See generally Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 215 (2009) (offering various perspective regarding the underlying reasons
for, and implications of, the Caperton decision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing
Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standardfor
ConstitutionalJudicialRecusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010).
5 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2

6 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
'Newshour: Pros and Cons of EmbeddedJournalism (PBS television
broadcast Mar. 27, 2003), availableat
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june03/embed_3-27.html
(observing that before an embedded journalist may join a battalion, he or she must
sign a contract restricting what he or she will report and when).
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administrative adjudicators, arbitrators, and mediators. Today, these
are often "embedded neutrals," 8 whose involvement is the result of
their association with one or more of the parties involved in the
dispute. Neutrals of this type have long existed to resolve disputes
within workplaces,9 faith communities,' 0 or between sophisticated
parties who are members of the same trade or profession and have
voluntarily chosen to be bound by an arbitrator's decision.I
Generally, this is not a problem. In these instances, the embedded
neutral often represents a wise, respected elder within the community

8 See

Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 17 (1983). Galanter first referenced "embedded forums," noting that they
range from those which are hardly distinguishable from the everyday
decisionmaking within an institution ("I'd like to see the manager.") to
those which are specially constituted to handle disputes which cannot be
resolved by everyday processes.. .. Resort to embedded forums is
encouraged where there are continuing relations between the disputants.
Continuing relations raise the cost of exit, they increase the likelihood of
some shared norms, and they supply opportunities for application of
sanctions-e.g., by direct withdrawal of beneficial relations or by damage
to reputation that reduces prospects for other beneficial relations.
Id.
9 See CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT, 41-50 (1996) (describing the "social
network mediator" and three variations of the "authoritative mediator"-i.e.,
benevolent mediator, administrative/managerial mediator, and vested interest
mediator).
'0 See Matthew 18:15-20 (urging someone who has been wronged to first
speak to the alleged wrongdoer, then to summon another, and then to refer the
matter to the church); JANE E. CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN DICKINSON (2008); WILLIAM M. OFFUTTr, JR., OF
"GOOD LAWS" AND "GOOD MEN": LAW AND SOCIETY INTHE DELAWARE VALLEY,
1680-1710, at 146 (1995) (discussing Quaker "Gospel Order" dispute resolution
system that put disputes in the hands of small groups of community members to
keep decisions away from outsiders); see also E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In
Defense ofMinority-CultureArbitration,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 1065 (1999)
(urging that "[m]inority-culture arbitration not only has great utility as a needed
safe harbor from majoritarian bias, it also holds great promise as an instrument of
systemic change").
" See Michael S. Maza, ArbitratorSelection andNeutrality Under the Railway
LaborAct: An Airline Employee's Perspective,4 J. AM. ARB. 327 (2005)
(describing the arbitration process used by Northwest Airlines and its unionized
pilots, focusing on the parties' selection of arbitrator panels that include two "party
arbitrators").
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or identity group to which both parties belong. This sort of embedded
neutral thus shares the norms that animate both of the disputing
parties and can help to resolve their dispute in a manner that both
parties are likely to view as principled.12
But the use of embedded neutrals becomes worrisome when the
neutrals' role is due to their special relationship with just one of the
parties, usually the more powerful repeat player, in uneven contests
between that repeat player and a one-time player. 13 This concern is
12See Amy J. Schmitz, Considerationof "ContractingCultures" in Enforcing

ArbitrationProvisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 123 (2007). Professor Schmitz
contrasts "extra communal contracting cultures" with "intra communal contracting
cultures." Id. at 145. The former are likely to involve one-time vs. repeat players
and noticeable disparities of power. Id. at 146. In contrast, "it seems that the more
intra communal a culture is, the more likely it is that negotiators within that culture
will have cooperative attitudes. Mutual dispute resolution values and needs in more
intra communal contracting cultures may counteract uneven economic resources
and lead to reasonable arbitration provisions." Id. at 165.
"See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 95 (1974). Galanter notes the
significant advantages that repeat players enjoy in comparison to one-time
players-e.g., experience leading to changes in how the repeat-player structures the
next similar transaction; expertise, economies of scale, and access to specialist
advocates; informal continuing relationships with institutional incumbents;
bargaining reputation and credibility; long-term strategies facilitating risk-taking in
appropriate cases; influencing rules through lobbying and other use of resources;
playing for precedent and favorable future rules; distinguishing between symbolic
and actual defeats; and investing resources in getting rules favorable to them
implemented-and contrasting these to disadvantages borne by one-time playerse.g., more at stake in given case; more risk averse; more interested in immediate
over long-term gain; less interested in precedent and favorable rules; not able to
form continuing relationships with courts or institutional representatives; not able
to use experience to structure future similar transactions; limited access to
specialist advocates. Id. at 97-100; see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration:The Repeat PlayerEffect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 195
(1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,Adhesive Contracts,and the Use of
Statistics in JudicialReview ofEmployment ArbitrationAwards, 29 McGEORGE L.
REv. 223, 225-27 (1998) (observing that repeat-player employers fare better in
arbitration than one-shot employees, that when repeat-player employers lose,
damages are lower than for one-time employers, and generally that enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements allows employers to structure the arbitration
process to their advantage); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All
There Is?: "The Problem" in Court-OrientedMediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv.
863, 874-76 (2008) (observing that the structure of court-oriented mediation has
evolved to favor preferences of repeat players).
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especially strong when the one-time player is not as sophisticated as
the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen the dispute
resolution forum that will be used to resolve her dispute, and is either
unaware of the special relationship between the neutral and the repeat
player or aware of the relationship but effectively unable to challenge
it.14 Consider, for example, the requirement that an individual citizen
exhaust the administrative procedures of an agency before a hearing
officer who is the employee or paid contractor of the very agency
whose policies and practices the individual is challenging. 5 Consider
mandatory arbitration conducted pursuant to a clause in a boilerplate
contract when the more-powerful employer or financial services
company creates the contract, inserts the arbitration clause, specifies
that the arbitration will be conducted by its own trade association 6 or
1 My thanks to my colleague, Catherine Rogers, for her assistance in helping
me to clarify these elements.
1 See OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 40 (2003) (describing agency
employees "fulfilling judge-like roles but doing so outside the confines" of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)); Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His
Justice": Inventing the FederalDistrict Courts of the Twentieth Centuryfor the
Districtof Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 662-63 (2002) (noting the
extent to which agencies are expanding the ranks of hearing officers, hearing
examiners and other decisionmakers who do not fall within the protections of the
APA); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Questfor Uiformity
Faltering?,10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 70-71 (1996) (regarding non-APA judges
in Departments of Justice, Agriculture and Defense); PENN STATE LAW, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH: A WHITE PAPER ON THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICE OF
IMMIGRATION JUDGES (2009) (raising concerns regarding the politicized hiring of
unqualified immigration judges and proposing reforms).
'6 See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2000) (in dispute
between corn farmer and operator of grain elevators, contract provided for
arbitration by National Grain & Feed Association; operator was a member of
NGFA, paid more than $26,000 annually in dues, and had a top employee on
NGFA's board; court nonetheless found that "[e]ven if all these facts are true, they
do not establish the direct, definite, demonstrable bias required"); Dolton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 935 A.2d 295 (D.C. 2007) (after losing nearly
$300,000, investors brought action against brokerage firm for failure to diversify
holdings after alleged repeated requests to do so; complaint was brought before
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., which denied claim; lower court and D.C. Court
of Appeals refused to vacate the award, finding insufficient evidence); Hottle v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, 846 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2004) (employee subjected to
arbitration before a five member panel of partners from his accounting firm).
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an organization that solicited inclusion in the contract, and refuses to
permit an employee or consumer to opt out of the arbitration
process.' 7 Even consider voluntary mediation offered by an
employer, hospital, or agency as an alternative to litigation,
arbitration," negotiation, or investigation when the mediators have
been admitted to the repeat players' panel because they possess the
particular experience, knowledge, and/or approach that the repeat
player values.' 9
As alternative dispute resolution (ADR) - and access to the role
of neutral - has become institutionalized by repeat players, it has also

17Suspicion heightened after some ADR firms announced that they would not
enforce boilerplate waivers of class action arbitrations, then "back[ed] down" in the
face of objections from lenders and other financial services institutions. See Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Is JAMS in a Jam Over Its Policy RegardingClass
Action Waivers in ConsumerArbitrationAgreements?, 61 Bus. LAW. 923 (2006);
Erick Bergquist, JAMS Backs Down on Class-Action Arbitration,AM. BANKER,
Mar. 11, 2005, at 1-5.
" See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolutionfor the
Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329 (2006).
19

See, e.g., Howard Gadlin, Bargainingin the Shadow of Management:

Integrated Conflict Management Systems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE

RESOLUTION 381 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (describing
how mediation and other dispute resolution processes have been co-opted by
managers to reassert their authority); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the
Looking Glass, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 591-93, 660 (2004)

(describing measures used by the U.S. Postal Service to ensure conformity with
transformative model of mediation and selection criteria used by the Pennsylvania
Special Education Mediation Service); Leah Wing, Mediationand Inequality
Reconsidered: Bringing the Discussion to the Table, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 383
(2009); Howard Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier Complexities ofRacial
DiscriminationComplaints in the Workplace, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at

25-26 (expressing uneasiness about use of mediation to respond to employment
discrimination claims and noting that "most people in the field are quick to dismiss
neutrality as a myth and to challenge the ideal of impartiality as illusory even while
those terms continue to be employed in most formal and informal mediator job
descriptions"); Christopher Guadagnino, MalpracticeMediation Poisedto Expand,
PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG., Apr. 2004, available at

http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/404.html ("The first institution in Pa. to
adopt a formal co-mediation program is Drexel University College of Medicine in
Philadelphia, which recently became self-insured after its previous malpractice
insurer pulled out of the medical malpractice line of business, according to
Drexel's Chief Counsel Tobey Oxholm, Esq.").
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become a lucrative private business, at least for some.2 0 There are
now notable instances of judges leaving the bench or retiring to
become private arbitrators and mediators.21 Very recently, the
American Bar Association reported that an arbitrator charged $900
per hour for his services and assessed a total fee of $400,000 after
casting his vote for a pay increase for New York City transit
workers.22 Other mediators charge similarly high rates.23
Commentators have begun to object to the corrupting influence or, at the very least, the appearance of a corrupting influence - of
repeat business and money on embedded neutrals' ability to "hold the
balance nice, clear and true," 24 particularly in uneven contests
between unsophisticated one-time players and the powerful repeat
players who require participation as a condition of doing business
with them. While commentators have raised such concerns in the

20

See, e.g., Linda R. Singer & Michael K. Lewis, Looking Forwardin
Mediation: Today's Successes and Tomorrow's Challenges, Disp. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring/Summer 2008, at 15, 16 (reporting that "JAMS, the only national for-profit
company offering the services of full-time, professional neutrals, maintains 23
offices across the country, with approximately 200 full-time mediators and
arbitrators. It currently generates approximately $100 million in annual revenue.");
Chris Serres, Arbitrary Concernfor the NationalArbitrationForum, STAR TIUB.,
May 10, 2008 (reporting that public documents show that NAF earned $10.14
million in 2006 on revenues of $39.37 million), availableat
http://www.startribune.com/business/18812529.html. Admittedly, however, some
sectors of the dispute resolution field-e.g., community mediation, victim-offender
mediation, special education mediation-remain a public service or avocation.
21See, e.g., Michael D. Hausfeld, Michael P. Lehmann & Megan E. Jones,
Observationsfrom the Field: ACPERA's FirstFive Years, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 95,
107 (2009) (describing retired Honorable Daniel Weinstein of JAMS as "one of the
nation's preeminent mediators of complex civil disputes").
22 See Martha Neil, Lawyer's $900/HourArbitrationFee Angers Transit Board
Members, A.B.A. J., Oct. 28, 2009, availableat
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
lawyers 900hour arbitration fee angers_transit boardmembers/.
23 See Urska Velikonja, Making Peace andMaking Money: Economic Analysis
of the Marketfor Mediators in PrivatePractice,72 ALB. L. REv. 257, 267-68
(2009) (reporting that most mediators provide services on a part-time basis, but
perhaps 1000 mediators gross $200,000 or more per year; a much smaller number
consistently bill more than $1 million per year).
24 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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administrative law realm,2 5 and other commentators are beginning to
raise such concerns about in-house 26 or agency-connected 27
mediation programs, the most significant concerns have involved
private, binding, mandatory arbitration.2 8
25 See John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The CentralPanel:A Response to
Critics, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 231, 232 (2004) (arguing that any
system in which decisionmakers are embedded within the agency creates the

potential for "pressure on [decisionmakers] to produce decisions favorable to the
agency"), cited in Emily M. Rector, Removing the Statefrom Administrative
Agencies, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2269 (2009).
26
See Howard Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier Complexities ofRacial
DiscriminationComplaints in the Workplace, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at
27 ("I think the EEO ADR process results in grievance settlement rather than
discrimination reduction. One would be hard pressed to find objective data or
subjective reports that discrimination has been reduced as a result of mediation
programs, or even that the racial climate in most agencies has improved."); Howard
Gadlin, Bargainingin the Shadow ofManagement: IntegratedConflict
ManagementSystems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 371 (Michael

L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
21 See Welsh, supranote 19, at 651-70 (raising concerns within the context of
Pennsylvania's special education mediation program).
28 In addition to the debate dealing directly with the advantages and
disadvantages of mandatory arbitration clauses, described in the text, many courts
and commentators have addressed these concerns in discussing unconscionability
and arbitrator bias. See, e.g., Mercuro v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 116
Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (making repeat-player effect
part of substantive unconscionability analysis and observing: "the fact that an
employer repeatedly appears before the same group of arbitrators conveys distinct
advantages over the individual employee ... [which include] knowledge of the
arbitrators' temperaments, procedural preferences, styles and the like and the
arbitrators' cultivation of further business by taking a 'split the difference'
approach to damages" and finding it significant that the arbitration agreement
provided for arbitral hearings "to be held within the federal judicial district in
which the employee was last employed by the company" because there were only
eight NAF arbitrators with offices in the Central District of California, thus making
the likelihood of the repeat-player effect more significant though not sufficient by
itself to make the arbitration agreement unconscionable); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones
& Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002) (articulating eight factors for when an arbitration
provision would be unconscionable, including whether "arbitrators tend to favor
'repeat players,' as opposed to workers or consumers who are unlikely to be
involved in arbitration again"); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the "HaveNots" in InternationalArbitration,8 NEV. L.J. 341 (2007); Catherine A. Rogers,
RegulatingInternationalArbitrators:A FunctionalApproach to Developing
Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53 (2005); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing
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Unconscionability'sSafety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006); David S.
Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration,Set It Free: How "Mandatory" Undermines
"Arbitration," 8 NEV. L.J. 400 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz, If You Love
Arbitration];David S. Schwartz, MandatoryArbitration andFairness,84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability,
andEquilibrium: The Return of UnconscionabilityAnalysis as a Counterweightto
ArbitrationFormalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757 (2004); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, MandatingMinimum Quality in Mass Arbitration,76 U. CIN. L. REV.
383, 401, 406, n.44-45, n.52 (2008) [hereinafter Stempel, Mandating Minimum
Quality]. In a series of cases, the Montana district court, in applying the factors
from Kloss, accepted the testimony of Professor William Corbett that "arbitrators
tend to favor repeat players in securities arbitrations" and denied U.S. Bancorp
Piper Jaffray's motions to compel arbitration. See Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper
Jaffray, Inc., No. DV-02-77 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1122 (Nov. 9, 2006); Mett v. U.S.
Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., No. DV-02-29 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1255 (Apr. 22,
2005); Estate of Alice A. Franey v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Inc., DV-02-36
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2170 (Apr. 22, 2004); Tomazich v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray.
Inc., DV-02-131 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3702 (Apr. 7,2004); Willems v. U.S. Bancorp
Piper Jaffray. Inc., DV-03-25 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3691 (Apr. 7, 2004); Zigrang v.
U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. Inc., DV-02-77 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3704 (Apr. 7,
2004). In three different decisions, three different courts concluded that the
arbitration provider that Ryan's Family Steak Houses decided to use, Employment
Dispute Services, Inc. (EDS), was biased in favor of repeat players. See Penn v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001); Floss v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000); Walker v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (observing
that Ryan's paid half of the organization's gross income in a year); Geiger v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995 (S.D. Ind. 2001). In
two out of the three cases, the court denied Ryan's motion to compel because it
found that the arbitration provision was unconscionable due to repeat-player bias.
In Penn, the court found that the EDS system was not inherently biased, but denied
the motion to compel based on a finding that the agreement lacked "mutuality of
obligation" thus rendering the contract unenforceable. 269 F.3d at 759. In refusing
to enforce the arbitration clause, the court took notice of the finding that that EDS's
sole business was employment disputes thus making it inappropriately dependent
on garnering business from employers. The court thus distinguished EDS from
AAA and NAF which had other sources of business. The court's primary focus,
however, was on EDS's control over the arbitration procedures. Id at 757. EDS had
the right under its rules to set the time and location of the arbitration proceedings,
could modify and interpret its rules, and had complete control over the names of
potential arbitrators from which the employer and employee chose. Id. According
to the court, this level of discretion rendered the employee's role in selection of the
arbitrator essentially meaningless. Id. at 759.
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In part, this critical focus on mandatory arbitration is the result of
California's statutory requirement 29 that arbitral organizations make
public disclosures of information that might indicate personal
favoritism toward repeat players, as well as potential bias on the part
of the provider organizations with which the arbitrators are
associated. 30 Drawn to the data that these disclosure requirements
produced, advocacy groups and academics began looking for
patterns. Within the last couple of years, they have released position
papers and reports grounded in California data.3 ' In turn, reporters,3 2
legislators, 33 academics, 34 public attorneys, 35 and even bloggers 36
Legislation was introduced after a series of newspaper articles revealed
apparent inequities in the arbitration of disputes between securities firms and their
employees. See Reynolds Holding, Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at Al; Reynolds Holding, Can Public Count on Fair
Arbitration?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2001, at Al5; Reynolds Holding, Judges'
Actions Cast Shadow on Court Integrity, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2001, at A13.
30
See Jay Folberg, ArbitrationEthics-Is Californiathe Future?, 18 OHIo ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 343, 347 (2003); Ruth V. Glick, CaliforniaArbitrationReform:
The Aftermath, U.S.F. L. REV. (2009); Richard Chernick, Imposed-Arbitration
Reforms Threaten To Stifle Strengths of CommercialArbitration,DisP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2002, at 16; Jay Folberg, ArbitrationEthics: Winds ofReform Blowing
from the West?, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 5 (describing reasons underlying
establishment of new disclosure requirements for arbitrators in California); Gail
Hillebrand, Should California'sEthics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?, DiSP.
29

RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 10.
31See infra Part II.
32 See Wade Goodwyn, Rape Victim's Case Shows FailingsofArbitration,
NPR, June 9, 2009, availableat
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=105153315 (describing
Public Citizen report and story of Halliburton employee who was allegedly raped
by other employees and now seeks to bring suit against Halliburton while
Halliburton is requiring employee to pursue claim through arbitration).
33 See Press Release, Congressman Dennis Kucinich, Kucinich Applauds Bank
of America for Abandoning Mandatory Arbitration (Aug. 13, 2009) (referencing
subcommittee investigation and report), availableat
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?optioncom-content&task=view&id-4040&I
temid=39.
34 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting(Out)
Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803 (2009).
3 The Office of the City Attorney in San Francisco filed an action against
NAF alleging unfair business practices in arbitrations and in making consumers
pay court costs and undetermined civil penalties. The credit card unit of Bank of
America and a collection company also were named as defendants in the complaint
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have begun to cite to these position papers and reports, often to
invoke them as calls to action.
Many others, however, have urged that all is well and that
alternative processes are inherently superior to37 - or at least no worse
than 38 - those offered by the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has
clearly aligned itself with this side of the debate. Indeed, with its
arbitral 39 and administrative law4 0 jurisprudence, the Court has
in the action. Sam Zuckerman, S.F. Sues Credit CardService, Alleging Bias, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 8, 2008, availableat http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-0408/business/17143343_1 national-arbitration-forum-credit-card-dispute-resolution.
36
See, e.g., Nancy Welsh, The Rise of the "EmbeddedNeutral? ", ADR PROF
BLOG, Dec. 5, 2007, http://www.indisputably.org/?p=46#more-46.
37 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 397 (2009) [hereinafter
Carbonneau, Triumph ofArbitration] (urging that "arbitration personifies due
process and justice" and "enables society to resolve disputes and to prosper by
dedicating its resources to other activities"); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial
Approbation in Building the Civilization ofArbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343
(2009).
3 See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 109-11 (2009),
availableat http://www.searlearbitration.org/p/full-report.pdf [hereinafter SEARLE
ARBITRATION REPORT].

3 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Professor Thomas
Carbonneau has remarked that "[i]n its decisional law, the Court is bent upon
delegating as much of the burden of civil litigation as possible to arbitration."
Carbonneau, Triumph ofArbitration,supra note 33, at 396 n.3.
40 See generally NLRB v. Matros Automated Elec. Constr. Corp., No. 092249-ag(L) 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2788 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2010) (following
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (holding that factual
findings of an ALJ are entitled to a standard of review based on the substantial
evidence test, a highly deferential standard where these findings can only be
overturned if they are not supported, or are contradicted by the record); John S.
Kane, Refining Chevron - Restoring JudicialReview to ProtectReligious Refugees,
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 554 (2008) (immigration judges on the Board of
Immigration Appeals can act as fact finders subject to judicial review under the
substantial evidence test); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and
Ends: Court ofAppeals Review ofAdministrative Law Judges'Findingsand
Opinions, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 661 (1989) (describing the great deference accorded
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encouraged both the development of embedded neutrals and
deference to the decisions and settlement agreements that these
neutrals produce. The Court has also regularly rejected one-time
players' general claims of structural bias, requiring instead that
parties prove the existence and impact of such bias in their cases.4 1
Change, however, may be in the air. The oft-introduced, 42 oftignored Arbitration Fairness Act 43 - which would ban the use of

to administrative law judges' fact-finding, resulting in growing power). But see
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Patrick
M. Garry, JudicialReview and the "HardLook" Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151, 16162 (2006) ("The purpose of the hard look doctrine 'involves providing a
substantive judicial check on agency power, through which the courts become a
sort of partner in the policy-making process, guaranteeing that agency decisions
serve the public interest. Under such an approach, only by a vigorous judicial
review can society ensure that administrative agencies act responsibly and
democratically."').
41See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)) (rejecting
"generalized attacks on arbitration" as "far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes");
Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 626-28 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
42 See Arbitration-CongressConsiders Bill To InvalidatePre-Dispute
ArbitrationClausesfor Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees-Arbitration
FairnessAct of2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARv. L. REV. 2262
(2008); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007) (banning the
use of predispute arbitration agreements in consumer, employment and franchise
contracts); Consumer Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 1443, 110th Cong. (2007)
(treating unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses as unfair and deceptive trade
practices and prohibiting use in consumer transactions); Predatory Mortgage
Lending Practices Reduction Act, H.R. 2061, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending
Consumer Credit Protection Act to render unenforceable any predispute arbitration
agreement in a consumer contract); see also William W. Park, Amending the
FederalArbitrationAct, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 75, 129-30 (2002). Park observes
that Congress could enact statutory safeguards to protect ill-informed individuals
and that
one can still appreciate how arbitration can become an instrument of
injustice when an arbitral institution dominated by a single industry
nominates arbitrators whose reappointment (thus compensation) indirectly
depends on the satisfaction given to the industry.... [M]y goal is simply
to emphasize that without limits on spillover from domestic to
international arbitration, the latter may not reach its full potential due to
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mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer, employment,
franchise, and civil rights matters, among others - has been
introduced again in the House and Senate and may be making
progress. The Minnesota Attorney General, meanwhile, recently
gathered sufficient information" to sue the largest U.S. provider of
consumer arbitration services, National Arbitration Forum (NAF), for
violation of Minnesota statutes prohibiting consumer fraud, deceptive
trade practices, and false advertising.4 5 A settlement quickly ensued
in that case, and NAF agreed to cease its consumer credit-card
arbitration services nationwide. 46 The venerable American
Arbitration Association (AAA) subsequently announced the
suspension and re-examination of its arbitration services for
consumer debt collection disputes. 4 7
Recently, in October 2009, the Wall Street Journalpublished a
front-page story based on the Minnesota lawsuit against NAF. 48 It
presents a fascinating yet depressing story of NAF's complex
uncertainty about the level of freedom from judicial intervention. A
separate statute would help to insulate arbitration from the undue judicial
intervention that is inevitable in consumer and employment cases.
Id.; Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration,supra note 28 (observing that
legislative proposals have also included modifying the standard ofjudicial review
for arbitral awards and arguing against the ineffective "blue-penciling" of
overreaching arbitration clauses).
43 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
"Complaint at 5, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009); see also Complaint, California v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, (S.F. Co. Super.
Ct. filed Mar. 24, 2008).
45 Complaint at 39-41, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July
14, 2009).
46 Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Turmoil in ArbitrationEmpire Upends CreditCardDisputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at Al, A20. The National Arbitration
Forum and related companies have also been sued recently by a putative class of
individuals who had consumer debt and whose cases were resolved through
binding arbitration, conducted primarily by the National Arbitration Forum. See In
re Nat'l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., Civ. No. 09-1939, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15178, at *2-5 (D. Minn. Feb. 22,2010) (denying defendants'
12(b)(6) motion). Finally, the National Arbitration Forum has been sued by a
former employee alleging fraudulent and corrupt practices. Id. at 1 (referencing
allegations in Richert v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Civ. No. 09-763, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96160 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2009)).
47 Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
48 See id.
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relationship with a web of other organizations involved in debt
collection and the ambition of the CEO of one such company
(Accretive) to "build a billion dollar empire in the realm of
consumer-debt disputes .. . standing at the center of a complex
arrangement linking America's biggest arbitrator of consumer creditcard disputes with another business that collects debts in some of
those same cases." 49
Now, as some dispute resolution infrastructures begin to crumble
and stories begin to emerge of greed or the quest for power
apparently overtaking good sense, it seems an appropriate time to
explore models that exist for effectively safeguarding the impartiality
of embedded neutrals. This Article will consider whether the analysis
in Caperton50 - conducting a close examination of the volume and
flow of money, its timing, and the plausibility of its effect on an
adjudicated outcome in order to assess the risk that substantial
campaign contributions can present to the legitimacy of courts
conducting a close examination of the volume and flow of money, its
timing, and the plausibility of its effect on an adjudicated outcome may serve as one such model. In order to explore this possibility, this
Article will begin by examining the factual details and analysis of
Caperton. PartII will then discuss the use and perceptions of
embedded neutrals, especially in mandatory arbitration of consumer,
employment and securities disputes. Part III describes the allegations
against NAF contained in the complaint in the Minnesota lawsuit and
applies Caperton'sconstitutional, risk-based objective standard to a
hypothetical individual NAF arbitrator to determine whether NAF's
corporate and financial structure presented such a probability of bias
that it made an individual arbitrator's service inconsistent with the
provision of due process. Then in Part IV this Article will turn to the
precedents upon which Caperton rests in order to explore the point at
which an arbitral institutioncould be deemed so biased that its
continued involvement as a decision-making body - or its failure to
establish structural protections from such potential bias - could also
violate the Constitution.
There are many challenges in the approach taken in this Article.
Chief among them is the reality that arbitral institutions are generally

49 Id.

s0 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

510

30-2

private, rather than public, dispute resolution bodies. Thus, it is
problematic to apply the requirements of the Constitution directly to
them. Nonetheless, this Article and the risk-based objective standard
established in Caperton and its antecedents offer an important
approach to assessing the sufficiency of the impartiality offered by
embedded neutrals, particularly when they - or those providing them
with access to disputes - urge that such bodies should be treated as
adequate replacements for independent and public trial courts.

II.

THE DICKENSIAN TALE OF CAPERTON V. A. T MASSEY COAL CO.

The facts of Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,' as described by
Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion, are so essential 52 to
understanding the Court's decision to grant certiorari and to reverse
the decision of West Virginia's highest court that this Article will
begin with a brief recapitulation.5 3 In 1998, Hugh Caperton, Harman
Development Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation and
Sovereign Coal Sales ("Caperton") sued A.T. Massey Coal Co. and
its affiliates ("Massey") in West Virginia state court for fraudulent
misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with
existing contractual relations. 54 The case went to trial before a jury.
On August 1, 2002, the jury found Massey liable and awarded
Caperton approximately $50 million in compensatory and punitive
damages." In post-trial motions filed soon afterwards in August

51 Id.

52 The people and events involved also would seem to be the stuff of fiction,

not real life. Indeed, John Grisham has suggested that the events involved in this
case served as partial inspiration for his 2008 novel The Appeal. See Blake
Fleetwood, The Best Judge $3 Million Can Buy, HUFFINGTON POST, June 12, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/blake-fleetwood/the-best-judge-3million b_214639.html.
* The corporate transactions, contract terms, governmental regulations,
closing of a Pittsburgh coke plant, Virginia lawsuit, and general pattern of strategic
risk-taking that preceded this lawsuit are described in some detail in Caperton v.
A. T Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 (Nov. 21, 2007).
54 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
For a more complete description of the procedural history, see id. at *19-20.
6
Id. at *20.
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2002, Massey challenged both the verdict and the damages award."
Nearly three years later in March 2005, the state trial court denied
these motions, "finding that Massey 'intentionally acted in utter
disregard of [Caperton's] rights and ultimately destroyed [Caperton's]
businesses because, after conducting cost-benefit analyses, [Massey]
concluded that it was in its financial interest to do so."'58
Don Blankenship, Massey's chairman, CEO, and president,
played a central role in the events leading up to the West Virginia
lawsuit and in the events that led from the adverse jury verdict to the
U.S. Supreme Court.s9 At some point after the jury verdict in 2002
but before the denial of the company's post-trial motions in 2005,
Blankenship decided to lend financial support to Brent Benjamin, a
Charleston attorney 60 seeking election to a seat on the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, the state's highest court. The seat was
held at that time by Justice Warren McGraw. Blankenship made a
direct contribution of $1000 to Benjamin's campaign, the maximum
permitted by statute. 6 1Much more significantly, Blankenship

1 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. Massey had moved for judgment as a matter of
law, new trial or in the alternative, remittitur. Caperton, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 at
*5.
58 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
59 Don Blankenship has been described as a "coal baron" who has proven to be
"tougher than bedrock" in his all-out battles with citizens, politicians, and
regulators who fear the environmental and health effects of King Coal's blasting of
the state's mountaintops. Michael Shnayerson, The Rape ofAppalachia, VANITY
FAIR, May 2006, at 140.
60 Mr. Benjamin, who is now Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, had practiced civil litigation for twenty years in state and federal
courts. His specialty areas included toxic torts, complex litigation, and civil right
litigation involving the protection of children from physical and sexual abuse. See
Justice Brent D. Benjamin, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/benjamin.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009).
61 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. West Virginia law provides:
No person may, directly or indirectly, make any
contribution in excess of the value of one thousand
dollars in connection with any campaign for nomination
or election to or on behalf of any statewide office, in
connection with any other campaign for nomination or
election to or on behalf of any other elective office in
the state or any of its subdivisions, or in connection
with or on behalf of any person engaged in furthering,
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contributed nearly $2.5 million to And For the Sake of the Kids, a
political organization that opposed McGraw and supported
Benjamin. 62 Further, Blankenship spent a little more than $500,000
of his own money in direct support of Benjamin, accomplished
through mailings, letters soliciting donations, and television and
newspaper advertisements. 6 3 In all, Blankenship spent approximately
$3 million to support Benjamin's bid for a seat on the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia.
In his opinion on behalf of a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy 64 chose to put these contributions into the following
perspective:
Blankenship's donations accounted for more than
two-thirds of the total funds [And For the Sake of
the Kids] raised .. . [and] Blankenship's $3 million
in contributions were more than the total amount
spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three
times [or 300%] the amount spent by Benjamin's
own committee. 65
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Caperton added that
Blankenship's expenditures on Benjamin's behalf were so large that
they exceeded - by $1 million - "the total amount spent by the

advancing, supporting or aiding the nomination or
election of any candidate for any of the offices.
W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (2009).
62 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
63 Id.
I The choice of Justice Kennedy to write the majority opinion is interesting.
He has previously said: "The law makes a promise of neutrality. If the promise gets
broken, the law as we know it ceases to exist. All that's left is the dictate of a
tyrant, or perhaps a mob." AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS vi (July 2001) (quoting J. Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the ABA

Symposium on Judicial Independence (Dec. 1998)), availableat

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abajudfinrpt072001.pdf, cited in James
Andrew Wynn & Eli Paul Mazur, JudicialDiversity: Where Independence and
Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REv. 775, 778 (2004).
65 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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campaign committees of both candidates combined."6 6 There is no
doubt that Blankenship was committed to the success of Benjamin's
campaign.
In the general election held in 2004, Benjamin defeated McGraw
53.3% to 46.7%, by a margin of 47,735 votes. 67 Massey did not enter
its appeal of the trial court's adverse decision on the motion for
judgment as a matter of law until 2006.68 Nonetheless - and perhaps
consistent with the history of strategic risk-seeking demonstrated by
both parties in the events leading up to this case 69 - Caperton moved
to disqualify then-Justice Benjamin in October 2005, relying on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the West
Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.7 0
In April 2006,71 Justice Benjamin denied Caperton's motion for
disqualification.72 He observed that he had carefully reviewed
Caperton's submissions and found "no objective information"
showing that he had a bias "for or against any litigant[,]" 73 that he
had prejudged the case, or that he would be "anything but fair and
impartial."74 Finally, in October 2006, Massey filed its petition for
appeal to challenge the adverse jury verdict, and the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals granted review. Nearly another year
passed before the court announced its decision in November 2007 to
reverse the $50 million verdict against Massey. 75 It was a 3-2
decision. The majority consisted of Justice Benjamin, along with
then-Chief Justice Robin Davis and Justice Elliot Maynard. The

66 Id.
67 Id.

Apparently, there had been additional delays in the case due to difficulties
with the trial transcript. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007
W. Va. LEXIS 119 at *20 n.20 (Nov. 21, 2007).
68

69

Id.

See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
was just a few months before the circuit court certified the trial
transcript, on August 23, 2006, with the appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals filed on October 24, 2006. See Caperton,2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119, at
*20 n.20.
72 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
7 Id. at 2258.
74 Id. at 2257-58.
7 Id. at 2258.
70

71 This
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dissenters were Justices Larry Starcher and Joseph Albright.
Interestingly, the three judges in the majority found that Massey
should have lost on substantive grounds, stating that "Massey's
conduct warranted the type of judgment rendered in this case." 6 The
reversal, however, was based on procedural grounds - "that a forumselection clause contained in a contract to which Massey was not a
party barred the suit in West Virginia and ... that res judicata barred
the suit due to an out-of-state judgment to which Massey was not a
party." 7
Caperton sought rehearing, and both parties then moved for the
disqualification of selected justices. Justice Starcher had apparently
made public pronouncements criticizing Blankenship's role in the
2004 judicial elections.7 8 Meanwhile, photos had appeared showing
Blankenship and Justice Maynard vacationing together in the French
Riviera while the case was pending. 79 The motion for disqualification
of Justice Benjamin rehashed the arguments that had been made and
rejected earlier.80
Both Justices Starcher and Maynard granted the parties' recusal
motions. 8 ' In his recusal memorandum, Justice Starcher apparently
reached out to Justice Benjamin and observed that "Blankenship's
bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and 'friendship'
have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court." 82 Justice Benjamin

76jd

n Id. These procedural decisions may deserve study all by themselves.
78
1d.
8

Id.

81 Id.

Order of Justice Starcher Regarding Recusal at 8, Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119 (Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter
Starcher Recusal Memorandum]. Justice Starcher added:
And I have seen that cancer grow and grow, in ways that I may not
fully disclose at this time. At this point, I believe that my stepping aside in
the instant case might be a step in treating that cancer-but only if others
as well rise to the challenge. If they do not, then I shudder to think of the
cynicism and disgust that the lawyers, judges, and citizens of this
wonderful State will feel about our justice system.
Id. at 9. Clearly, this controversy had become personal and painful. Justice
Starcher observed, for example, that Mr. Blankenship had "sported a 'Get Starcher'
82
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either did not read his colleague's memorandum or was not persuaded
by its analysis. He denied Caperton's recusal motion.83
In the subsequent rehearing, Justice Benjamin served in the
capacity of acting chief justice 84 and thus was responsible for
selecting two new justices to replace the recused justices. During this
time, he also denied a third recusal motion, in which Caperton argued
that recusal was required under West Virginia law and introduced
new evidence: "a public opinion poll indicating that over 67% of
West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin would be fair and
impartial.",8 Justice Benjamin again refused to withdraw, attacking
the credibility of the poll.8 6
Another few months passed and in April 2008, the court again
issued a 3-2 decision and again based its decision on the two
procedural grounds described above.87 Justices Benjamin and Davis
were again in the majority, joined by one of the newly assigned
ball cap announcing me as his 'next target' as he publicly celebrated spending
millions to influence elections in our State," id. at 3, and that
this type of "big money" . . . has been and continues to be directed at
wounding our State's judiciary with false claims portraying West Virginia
as a "judicial hellhole," false claims that facts do not support and false
claims that have been refuted by academic researchers at West Virginia
University. These claims are simply false, but truth and accuracy mean
nothing to people who want to skew the justice system in their favor.
Id. at 7-8.
83 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. Justice Benjamin's 2008 concurring opinion
does not indicate whether he was aware of the magnitude of Blankenship's
campaign contributions at the time they were made. Id. at 2259. The question is
whether Justice Benjamin should have known or was required to conduct an
investigation of some sort. Such obligations are imposed in other contexts. See, for
example, FED. R. Clv. P. 11(b), requiring lawyers' certification that "to the best of
[their] knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances[,]" pleadings, written motions and other papers meet certain
requirements.
* Justice Starcher's recusal memorandum indicated that there had been a
recent vote "to remove two justices from the Chief Justice rotation order, materially
affecting the appointment of replacement judges in cases involving Mr.
Blankenship's companies" and that Justice Benjamin had been one of the judges
voting in favor of that removal. Starcher Recusal Memorandum, supra note 82, at
4.
85 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
86Id

87

Id.
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justices.88 Justices Albright and Cookman dissented, observing: "Not
only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing
case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was
neither honored nor served by the majority."" A month after
Caperton filed its petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice Benjamin filed a concurring opinion which included a
defense of his decision not to recuse himself.90 He relied, as he had
previously, on Caperton's failure to show that he had a ""direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in this case." 9 Further,
Justice Benjamin asserted that "[a]dopting 'a standard merely of
"appearances" . . . seems little more than an invitation to subject West
Virginia's justice system to the vagaries of the day - a framework in
which predictability and stability yield to supposition, innuendo, halftruths, and partisan manipulations."' 92
A. The Court's Analysis in Caperton
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a justice
who was in the majority in a 3-2 decision to reverse a jury verdict of
$50 million violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when he denied a recusal motion based on his direct and
indirect receipt of "campaign contributions in an extraordinary
amount from, and through the efforts of the board chairman and
principal officer of the corporation found liable for the damages."93
Finding that "there are objective standards that require recusal when
'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable[,] "94 a
majority of the Court found that Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse
himself had indeed violated the Due Process Clause.

Id.
Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 284 (W.
Va. 2008) (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting)).
9Id. at 2259.
91 Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 295 (W.
Va. 2008)).
92
Id. (quoting Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 306).
9 Id. at 2256-57.
94
Id. at 2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
88

9
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It must be noted that the Supreme Court's decision was based
only on a violation of the Due Process Clause, not on a violation of
the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.95 And throughout his
opinion, Justice Kennedy made it clear that the Supreme Court's
determination of a constitutional violation was required by the
"extreme facts" 96 of the case that pushed the "probability of actual
bias" 97 to "an unconstitutional level."9 8 We can thus infer that with
less extreme facts, a majority of the Supreme Court would have left
the matter to be remedied by the West Virginia Legislature, which
could have taken legislative action after noticing that the state's
highest court refused to find a violation of the West Virginia Code of
Judicial Conduct. It appears, perhaps significantly, that the West
Virginia Legislature had not taken such action despite the many
opportunities presented by the excruciatingly slow unfolding of
events in this case. 99
Justice Kennedy's opinion returns repeatedly to the need to
determine whether recusal was required in this case as an "objective
matter." 00 If a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest," this clearly violates the objective standard.' 0 ' But
95 Id. at 2267.
96

Id. at 2265-66.
Id. at 2259, 2262, 2265.
98
Id. at 2265.
97

9 Before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Caperton,there were
proposals for judicial election reform in West Virginia. See John O'Brien, Public
Financingof W Va. Election to be Weighed in Legislature,LEGAL
NEWSLINE.COM, Mar. 8, 2009, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/219689public-financing-of-w.va.-election-to-be-weighed-in-legislature. The Governor's
Office announced plans to study judicial reform, however, and requested
suspension of legislative efforts. See Walt Williams, Governor's Opposition Slows
PublicFinancingBill, ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, available at
http://statejournal.com/story.cfn?func=viewstory&storyid=55763. To date, there
have not been any changes to the procedures or standards governing judicial
recusal or to judicial elections in the state. See N.Y. UNiv. SCHOOL OF LAW:
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 2009 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION INITIATIVES IN THE

STATES (Jan. 20, 2010) and 2009 JUDICIAL SELECTION INTHE STATES (Jan. 20,

2009),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/statejudicial
1oo Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
101Id.

reform efforts_2009
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Caperton'sinnovation comes in finding that admittedly legal
campaign contributions can nonetheless create "circumstances 'in
which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the
part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable."" 0 2 Precedent revealed two types of circumstances that
present this grave danger. First, the individual judge can share such a
strong identity of interest with an organization that his concern for
the financial well-being of the organization is likely to "affect [his]
judgment."'o Second, the judge may have been so personally
offended or affected by his interaction with a party in a prior, private
proceeding that it will be "difficult if not impossible . . . to free

himself from the influence of what took place"'" in that prior
proceeding. In both of these instances, the risk is too great that the
judge will be unable to maintain the detachment needed to be
sufficiently independent and impartial to provide a process that
avoids violating the Due Process Clause.' 0 5 The language of Tumey v.
Ohio,' 06 quoted in Caperton,is particularly evocative here:
Every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and
the accused, denies the latter due process of law. 0 7
Justice Kennedy put his own gloss on the test enunciated in
Tumey by explaining it in the contemporary language of risk
management' 0 8 : "The Court asks not whether the judge is actually,
102Id. at
103Id. at

2257 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
2260 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
'"Id.at 2261 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138 (1955)).
1os See Wynn & Mazur, supra note 59, at 778 (observing that "judicial
independence is predicated on a neutralizing distance between the judge and the
legal dispute").
106 273 U.S. 510.
107Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532) (emphasis
added).
1s Risk analysis, which is dependent upon probability assessments and
psychological factors, is a staple of decision-making and dispute resolution
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subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is
'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional
'potential for bias."'l0 9 Elsewhere, he wrote: "In defining these
standards the Court has asked whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weaknesses,' the interest 'poses
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.""' 0
The challenge was then to apply these precedents to the facts of
Caperton, involving the influence of money in judicial elections.
Repeatedly referring to Caperton's facts as "exceptional," Justice

literature and practice. See, e.g., Marjorie Aaron, For the GeneralPractioner:
Dispute Resolutions: Do's and Don'tsfor Mediation, GP SOLO, Mar. 2006, at 30;
John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics ofSettlement, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1129, 1138 (2009) (surveying research regarding the factors that trigger
risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior in considering settlement); Chris Guthrie,
ProspectTheory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116-17
(2003) (explaining prospect theory, analyzing its use in the legal field, and
concluding that the theory is a valuable tool in analyzing legal issues); Jason S.
Johnston, Paradoxesof the Safe Society: A RationalActor Approach to the
ReconceptualizationofRisk and the Reformation ofRisk Regulation, 151 U. PENN.
L. REV. 747, 768, 780 (2003) (examining the "phenomenon of increasingly
widespread and yet increasingly consequence-free risk taking" in the U.S. and
suggesting the establishment of "regulatory populism"); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision UnderRisk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); Jeffrey Senger, Decision Analysis in Negotiation,
87 MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2004).
109Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
110

Id. at 2263 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Chris
Guthrie and Jeff Rachlinski have written many articles examining the cognitive and
other biases that affect judicial decision-making. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary":An Empirical
Examination ofExecutive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect TrialJudges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich,
Blinking On the Bench: How JudgesDecide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007);
Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1227 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics,Biases, and Governance, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567 (Derek J.

Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004); see also Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing,in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567 (Derek J.

Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004).
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Kennedy examined the "relative size"' of Blankenship's (and
Massey's) contributions to Justice Benjamin's campaign and the
"apparenteffect"'12 - as distinct from the actual,provable effect such contributions had on the election results. Though $3 million
may seem a small amount to invest in order to save $50 million,
Blankenship's donations dwarfed the monies that were contributed by
others interested in this judicial campaign." 3 Justice Kennedy also
acknowledged that other events may have played a role in Benjamin's
electoral victory," 4 but nonetheless concluded that "Blankenship's
campaign contributions - in comparison to the total amount
contributed to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the
election - had a significant and disproportionate influence on the
electoral outcome.""' 5 The risk that Blankenship's influence
engendered actual bias was sufficiently substantial that it "must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented."ll 6
Justice Kennedy then examined the "temporal relationship" 7
between the campaign contributions, the justice's election, and the
pendency of Massey's appeal."" 8 He concluded that it was
"reasonably foreseeable" to Blankenship when he made his donations
that the appeal of the $50 million judgment against his company
would ultimately end up before Justice Benjamin.11 9 Under these
circumstances:

"1 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
112

3

"

Id.

Id. at 2257.

4

11 Id. at 2264.

115Id.

"' Id. (quoting Withrow, 412 U.S. at 47).
"1 Justice Kennedy uses very interesting phrasing here. "Temporal" evokes
both relatively simple issues of timing and the much more complex matter of
acknowledging human beings' earthly, non-divine natures. See Merriam-Webster's
Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/netdict/temporal (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010) (defining "temporal" as "of or relating to time as opposed to
eternity," "of or relating to earthly life," "lay or secular rather than clerical or
sacred").
"1 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
9

H

Id. at 2264-65.
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Although there is no allegation of a quidpro quo
agreement, the fact remains that Blankenship's
extraordinary contributions were made at a time
when he had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as
no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,
similar fears of bias can arise when - without the
consent of the other parties - a man chooses the
judge in his own cause. And applying this principle
to the judicial election process, there was here a
serious, objective risk of actual bias that required
Justice Benjamin's recusal.120
Both the objectively significant and comparatively
disproportionate size of Blankenship's contributions, along with the
worrisome "temporal relationship" suggested by the timing of these
contributions, the election, the appeal and its results signaled an
unconstitutional potential for bias. A majority of the Justices of the
Supreme Court concluded that this case represented a situation in
which an average judge - who, despite his or her ceremonial robe,'21
is a human being just like the rest of uS122 - would be

120

Id. at 2265.

121Which is meant to symbolize and remind the wearer of his or her obligation
to live up to his or her sacred role and duties. See, e.g., Raymond Daniell, Elizabeth
II Crowned in Abbey; Millions Cheer Paradein Rain; Ruler Bids Subjects Look
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1953, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/learning/
general/onthisday/big/0602.html ("The ceremony of coronation, anachronistic as it
may seem, harking back to the symbols of an age that is dead and gone, is an
important factor in holding the heterogeneous British family of nations together. It
stems from ancient superstitions and belief in the magic properties and symbolism
of what Broadway would call 'props' but the fact is that it works.").
122 Literature and music are filled with tales of temptation. Usually, the devil
seems to win-but perhaps that is because tales of forbearance are not nearly as
interesting. Compare, for example, the Bible's depiction of the Devil's temptation
of Jesus in the desert with Goethe's Faust,Charlie Daniels' The Devil Went Down
to Georgia, and Robert Johnson's CrossroadsBlues. Matthew 4:1-11; Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: Part One (David Luke trans., Penguin 1998) (1808);
CHARLIE DANIELS, The Devil Went Down to Georgia, on MILLION MILE
REFLECTIONS (Epic 1979); ROBERT JOHNSON, CrossroadBlues, on THE COMPLETE

RECORDINGS (Columbia 1990) (1937).
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unconstitutionally tempted "not to hold the balance nice, clear and
1 23

true."

It is notable that four Justices dissented. This Article will not
examine their reasoning in any detail. In a sense, however, both the
majority and two dissenting opinions seem to be indirect responses to
the many criticisms and expectations directed at individual judges
and the judicial branch in general within the past decade.124 Indeed,
all three opinions suggest that the Justices agree that the institution of
the judiciary is in danger of losing its legitimacy or standing and thus
requires some form of protection. The Justices' disagreement
involved their differing assessments of the best means to achieve that
protection. Instead of recognizing a constitutionally significant,
judicially cognizable harm, the dissenters would have accomplished
this goal by forcing Caperton to either live with the court's result or
seek help from the West Virginia Legislature or Governor.12 5
(Another option, not mentioned by the dissenters but certainly
encouraged by the Supreme Court's arbitral jurisprudence, is that
Caperton and those in a similar position should elect to opt out of the
judicial system for the resolution of future contentious disputes.) In
contrast, the majority concluded that the best protection for the
judiciary was to require an individual judge to bear the consequences
of his tone deaf decisions and swallow the bitter tonic of a public
(though relatively gentle) rebuke. The majority did not declare
Caperton the winner in this contest. It simply reversed and remanded
to give Caperton the chance to have his appeal heard one more time

123 Caperton, 129

S. Ct. at 2264 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532

(1927)).
24

1 See THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM.,

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (2006) (noting that the Chief Justice Rehnquist
had established the Committee, with Justice Breyer as its Chair, to look into the
implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 as a result of
recent criticism from Congress regarding the handling of allegations ofjudicial
misconduct within the federal judiciary).
125Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("States are, of
course, free to adopt broader recusal rules than the Constitution requires ...

."); see

also id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The relevant question, however, is whether
we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through
expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any
discemable rule.").
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by a panel of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that did
not include Justice Benjamin.1 26 Presumably, this decision might also
have provided Caperton and Massey with the opportunity to reach a
mutually agreeable settlement, though that is not what actually
happened when the case returned to West Virginia.127

II.

THE RISE AND PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF THE EMBEDDED NEUTRAL
IN THE ARBITRATION CONTEXT

It is now time to turn from judges to the embedded neutrals who
produce outcomes in administrative adjudication, arbitration, and
mediation and explore the data that have developed regarding onetime players' perceptions of the fairness of the procedures that these
neutrals oversee or facilitate. These perceptions and their
implications will help to explain why there is a need to do more to
manage the use of embedded neutrals. They also establish the need to
explore the question of whether Caperton'sreasoning - particularly
its establishment of a constitutional, objective standard based on "a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses" 28 and contemporary principles of risk management might be applied to NAF and its arbitrators.
Dispute resolution processes that were once viewed as
"alternative" are now ubiquitous in American life. In disputes with
agencies, courts now require citizens to exhaust administrative

26

Id. at 2267 (remanding to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for
proceedings not inconsistent with the majority opinion).
127 On November 12, 2009, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again
1

determined that the state circuit court had erred in denying Massey's motion to
dismiss, based on the existence of a forum selection clause in a contract that
"directly related to the conflict giving rise to the instant lawsuit." Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107 (Sept. 8, 2009). Despite
winning before the U.S. Supreme Court, Hugh Caperton lost again in West
Virginia. He has since filed a petition for rehearing. See Jeffrey V. Mehalic,
Caperton FilesPetitionfor Rehearing with WV Supreme Court,W. VA. Bus.
LITIG., Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.wvbusinesslitigationblog.com/2009/12/articles/appellatedecisions/caperton-files-petition-for-rehearing-with-wv-supreme-court/.
128 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
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procedures before they may file a lawsuit.129 The courts also grant
substantial deference to the decisions of administrative
adjudicators.' 3 0 Similarly, courts enforce mandatory arbitration
clauses in a wide variety of boilerplate contracts. When consumers
buy computers or cell phones, receive a credit card, or even enter into
a contract to receive professional services,1 3 1 they will often find that
any disputes that arise must be resolved through arbitration. Based
primarily on the language of the Federal Arbitration Act,'3 2 courts
generally are more deferential to the decisions of arbitrators than they
are to administrative adjudicators.1 33 Courts are now beginning to
129

See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and

final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review."); see also Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 433 F.3d 772 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the appellate court did not have
jurisdiction because the Silverton Snowmobile Club did not exhaust their
administrative remedies); Raoul Berger, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies, 48
YALE L. J. 981, 1006 (1938) ("Administrative remedies must be exhausted before
resort is had to the federal courts."); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 474
(2010). But see Rebecca L. Donnellan, The ExhaustionDoctrineShould Not Be a
Doctrine with Exceptions, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 361 (2001) (describing exceptions
to the exhaustion requirement, including where resort to those remedies may
prejudice a subsequent judicial challenge of the agency action, the agency's remedy
may be inadequate, an administrative remedy would be inadequate because the
administrative agency is shown to be biased or to have otherwise predetermined the
issues before it, or administrative remedies would be futile).
130 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). But see Garry, supra note 40.
131 See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 218 (2001), availableat
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions/opinion218.cfn.
132 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
13 In addition to the grounds for vacatur provided directly in the FAA, three
common law grounds have developed: manifest disregard of the law, arbitrary or
capricious or irrational, and violation of public policy. The status of manifest
disregard is somewhat unclear. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
585 (2008) (calling "manifest disregard" into question by stating that it may not be
new grounds for review but a way to refer to all of standards collectively); Bosack
v. Soward, 573 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Arbitrators exceed their powers
when they express a 'manifest disregard of law,' or when they issue an award that
is 'completely irrational."'); see also Michael H. LeRoy, Crowningthe New King:
The Statutory Arbitratorand the Demise ofJudicialReview, 2009 J. DiSP. RESOL.
1, 34-40 (observing that appellate courts vacate trial court decisions three times
more often than they vacate arbitral awards; also noting different levels of
deference extended to employee wins versus employer wins in arbitration as well
as arbitral awards in Title VII matters versus breach of contract cases).
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enforce mediation clauses - between employers and employees' 34 and
between corporate purchasers and sellers' 35 - with analyses that are
similar to those they have used for arbitration clauses. With some
instructive exceptions,136 courts also generally seem ready to defer to
the mediators who have brokered settlement agreements, regardless
of whether the mediations were conducted as part of a courtconnected mediation program' 37 or on an ad hoc, private basis.'3 8
A worrisome percentage of these examples involve uneven
contests. On one side is the individual, one-time player. On the other
side is the institutional, repeat player. As is true in traditional
litigation, the repeat player often is more powerful, with greater
access to resources and more familiarity with these types of disputes
and the procedures to resolve them. What is new - or perhaps, more
accurately, what is a modem variation of a dynamic that is very, very
old 39 - is courts' support for the control exerted by institutional
134 See Jason Schatz, Imposing Mandatory Mediation ofPublic Employment
Disputes in New Jersey to Ameliorate an ImpendingFiscal Crisis, 57 RUTGERs L.
REv. 1111, 1124 (2005) (noting that voluntary mediation programs sponsored by
employers have been deemed enforceable).
15 See, e.g., Gate Precast Co. v. Kenwood Towne Place, LLC, 2009 WL
3614931 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2009) (ordering mediation pursuant to clause).
16 See, e.g., Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
131See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable PriceofInstitutionalization?,6 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2001).
1" See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, DisputingIrony: A Systematic
Look at LitigationAbout Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 73, 75 (2006)
(describing research conducted on mediation litigation cases from 1999-2003,
which revealed that courts enforced disputed mediated agreements in 62% of cases;
also noting that courts in California use public judicial powers to resolve private
disputes in an ad hoc manner, although the majority of the resulting opinions
emanating from these disputes are unpublished, and California courts do not allow
parties to cite or rely on unpublished opinions; as a result, most of the
jurisprudence in the mediation process comes from the private arena); James R.
Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REv. 395, 403-05 (observing that nearly half of the opinions in
the mediation litigation database involved challenges to the enforcement of
mediated settlements, courts enforced 62% of the cases, and that the traditional
contract defenses of fraud, mistake, duress, or undue influence were unlikely to be
successful).
139 See Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudicein Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1387-88,
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repeat players over the selection of the organization that will provide
the dispute resolution services, the procedures that will be used, and
the criteria that will be used to determine the pool of neutrals who
will decide cases or facilitate their resolution.140
Commentators have increasingly used these concerns to attack
mandatory arbitration of consumer, employment, franchise,
securities, civil rights, and nursing home disputes as unfair.141 A
couple of years ago, the non-profit organization Public Citizen
released a report' 4 2 that was based on California data detailing creditcard companies' nearly 95% win rates in mandatory arbitrations.' 43

1391 (1985) (stating ADR does little to counter historical and subconscious
prejudice, and arguing judicial system should be used to encourage fairness and
deter prejudice because such systems are formal, subject to more control, and can
reduce prejudice); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984) (arguing ADR should not be allowed because parties are often coerced to
settle and absence of judicial involvement raises various concerns); Tina Grillo,
The MediationAlternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
1549-50 (1991) (opposing mandatory family mediation because it requires parties
to interact in forced setting, women often feel obliged to maintain connection with
ex-partner during process, and it is potentially destructive because parties were
once involved in intimate relationship); see also Symposium, Against Settlement:
Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1117 (2009).
1" Such control has the potential to reduce the diversity of the pool. See Carla
D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in ContemporaryAmerican
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1409, 1433 (2009) (noting the importance of
including black lawyers because they can serve as representatives and provide
"connective links" between black citizens and predominantly white institutions).
141See Jeffrey W. Stempel, MandatingMinimum Quality, supranote 28, at
399 n.38 (listing several articles that object to the phenomenon of "mass
arbitration").
142 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS
(Sept. 2007), availableat
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545.
143 See id. at 2 (specifying win rate of 94.7%). But see SEARLE ARBITRATION
REPORT, supranote 38, at xiii (reporting that in actions that consumers filed in
AAA consumer arbitrations, consumers won some relief 53.3% of the time and
business claimants-likely not limited to only credit-card companies-won some
relief 83.5% of the time; also reporting some evidence of a repeat-player effect but
suggesting that this reflected repeat players' better understanding of when to settle
prior to the arbitration); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The
CurrentState of Consumer Arbitration,15 DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 30, 31
(citing Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default JudgmentsAgainst
Consumers: Has the System Failed?,67 DENV. U. L. REv. 357 (1990)) (observing

Fall 2010

What is "(Im)partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals

527

Public Citizen asserted that these favorable rates were the result of
cozy relationships between arbitral firms and credit-card
companies.4"To bolster its charges, Public Citizen highlighted some
arbitral firms' reliance upon referrals from particular credit-card
companies for the majority of their cases, the large fees paid by some
credit-card companies to these firms, and the large numbers of cases
handled by a small number of individual arbitrators.14 5 For example,
Public Citizen reported that during the period from January 1, 2003,
through March 31, 2007, 53% of the nearly 34,000 cases handled by
NAF in California involved holders of MBNA credit cards. 146
Between January 1998 and November 1999, NAF had received $5.3
million from just one credit-card company, First USA.1 47 And
between January 1, 2003, and March 31, 2007, NAF's ten busiest
arbitrators heard between 699 and 1332 of the credit-card cases.1 48
Public Citizen also reported the experience of one NAF arbitrator,
Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, who stopped
receiving referrals from NAF after she awarded $48,000 to a
consumer on his counterclaim against the credit-card company suing
for collection.149 Professor Bartholet subsequently resigned in
protest. 50
Public Citizen's analysis of the data certainly was catalytic,
provoking responses from academics and public policy analysts

that in collection cases, the consumer almost certainly owes the debt and that this
explains credit-card companies' high win rates in both arbitrations and traditionally
litigated cases); Matthew C. McDonald & Kirkland E. Reid, Arbitration Opponents
Barking Up Wrong Branch, 52 ALA. LAW. 56, 60 (2001)).
'" PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 4.
145Id. at

13-27.
Id. at 14.
147 See id
148 Id. at 16.
49
1 Id. at 17, 30-31.
146

"s See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 31. Richard Neely, former justice
on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, also served as an NAF arbitrator.
Observing that NAF provided its arbitrators with a judgment form that was already
completed and required consumers to pay arbitration fees that were substantially
higher than court fees, Neely concluded that "[g]odless bloodsucking banks have
converted apparently neutral arbitration forums into collection agencies to exact the
last drop of blood from desperate debtors." Richard Neely, Arbitrationand the
Godless Bloodsuckers, W. VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 12, 12.
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defending the overall integrity of arbitration. While admitting the
existence of some problems with consumer arbitration, for example,
Professor Sarah Cole and colleagues pointed out that most of the
cases included in Public Citizen's analysis were collections cases, in
which the consumer almost certainly owed the amount claimed."'
They also noted that a high percentage of these cases result in default
judgments and that the "win rate" for credit-card companies in
arbitration mirrored their success rate in collections actions in
court. 152 Meanwhile, Professor Cole and her colleagues observed that
consumers benefited from the quick dispositions produced by
arbitration. 153
The Searle Civil Justice Institutel5 4 specifically commissioned a
Task Force on Consumer Arbitration to study consumer arbitrations
administered by the American Arbitration Association. The Task
Force, which was led by Professor Christopher Drahozal, produced a
preliminary report in March 2009.155 Though the sample size was
relatively small (301 files) and had other acknowledged limitations,
the Task Force found that when consumers were claimants, they won
some relief 53.3% of the time, while business claimants won some
relief 83.6% of the time. 156 The latter category was likely dominated
by debt-collection cases, which as noted above, tend to result in
awards for the business. The Task Force's close analysis of the award
amounts, meanwhile, produced the interesting result that "in 41 of the
51 cases in which a business claimant prevailed, the business

1s' Cole & Frank, supra note 143, at 31.
152
Id. at 31. Professor Cole and Mr. Frank also noted that Public Citizen had
studied only those cases that went to arbitration, thus removing from their sample
the cases that creditors decided to dismiss before the selection of an arbitrator, and
did not acknowledge consumers' success in achieving reductions in the amount
owed. Id. at 31-32. Their article also summarizes relevant findings from several
other studies. See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, EmpiricalResearch on
Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1051, 105859 (2009) (profiling NAF arbitrator Jonathan Krotinger who discounted awards by
approximately 30% yet continued to receive a large number of referrals from
NAF).
153See Cole & Blankley, supra note 136, at 1072-73.
15' Established in 2008 as a division of the Searle Center on Law, Regulation
and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law.
155
56

SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT, supra note 38.

' Id. at 67-68.
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recovered between 90.0% and 100.0% of the amount claimed" while
"in the 119 cases in which consumer claimants received monetary
awards, the consumer recovered 20.0% or less of the amount claimed
in 36 cases and between 90.0% and 100.0% of the amount claimed in
37 cases."157 Finally, while the Task Force found support for the
existence of a repeat-player advantage in terms of "win rates," the
evidence further suggested that this discrepancy was due to effective
case screening by repeat businesses rather than arbitrator bias. 58
In the employment arbitration context, researchers similarly have
found that employees win less frequently than employers in
arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory arbitration provisions
inserted by employers in personnel manuals or handbooks. 159
Employees' likelihood of winning is even weaker when their
employers are repeat players; their odds are worst of all when their
employers have used the same arbitrator more than once.1 60 Professor
Alexander Colvin reviewed the California data to determine the
results of employment arbitrations conducted by AAA arbitrators
pursuant to mandatory arbitration clauses in employer-promulgated
agreements. He found that employees won only 19.7% of these
cases 61 and were even less successful when their employers were

'" Id. at 70 (observing that this "bimodal" pattern of relatively clear winners
and losers is consistent with studies of AAA commercial arbitration awards and
international arbitration awards).
15

See id. at 76-82.

'" But see Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman, Compulsory Arbitration
as Partofa Broader Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The AnheuserBusch Example, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2008) (describing the AnheuserBusch dispute resolution program as reasonably fair, though also admitting a lack
of comparative data regarding outcomes or perceptual data from employees who
have used the program); Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview ofEmployment Arbitration
in the United States: Law, Public Policy andData, N.Z. J. INDUS. REL., June 1998,
at 5, 11-12, cited in Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch on Employment
Arbitration: ClarityAmidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
405, 412-13 (2007) (observing that these were predominantly claims brought by
managers or executives under individually-negotiated contracts).
160 Colvin, supra note 159, at 414-15 (describing other studies that found a
lower win rate for employees in claims based on employee handbooks rather than
individually-negotiated contracts).
161 Colvin, supra note 159, at 418. In contrast, employees arbitrating as a result
of individually negotiated contracts do quite well. In one study, they won 68.8% of
the time. In another, they won 61.3% of their cases. The employees arbitrating
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repeat players, then winning only 13.9% of the time.1 62 Employees
fared better when their employers were also one-time players,
winning 32% of these cases.' 63 Professor Colvin also found cases
involving repeat-player employers who had used the same arbitrator
more than once. Employees had the worst odds in these cases,
winning only 11.3% of the time.M Like Public Citizen, Professor
Colvin also considered the income received by employment
arbitrators. He found that while the mean arbitral award for
employees was $23,233 165 (reflecting the many cases in which no
damages were awarded to the employee), the mean arbitrator fee was
a fairly substantial $10,351166 in cases involving a hearing and award,
regardless of whether the employee was awarded damages.
Importantly, in the employment arbitration context,
commentators continue to debate whether mandatory arbitration
produces significantly different results from courts. Researchers have
been unable to find such a difference when comparing higher-paid
employees' claims.' 67 On the other hand, they have uncovered
disparity when comparing lower-paid employees' claims. 68 It is
possible that because employment arbitration is often free, more of
these lower-paid employees choose to use the process, even for
frivolous claims.' 69 This could explain the lower-paid employees' low
win rate. In some instances, it appears that the employers who have
adopted employment arbitration have also institutionalized other
pursuant to individually negotiated contracts tend to be highly paid managers and
executives. The employees arbitrating pursuant to personnel manuals or handbooks
are likely to be lower-paid and lower-ranking employees. See id. at 413-14.
162 See id. at 430.
163See

id.

' See id.
165See id. at 433.
166See id. at 425.
167Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, ArbitrationandLitigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison,DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan.
2003, at 44.
16 See Schwartz, MandatoryArbitrationand Fairness,supranote 28, at 128799 (reporting the results of the Eisenberg and Hill study, supra note 167). But see
Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, ComparingLitigationandArbitration of
Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?,
Am. BAR Ass'N LITIG. SEC. CONFLICT MGMT., Winter 2003, at 11.
161 See Colvin, supranote 142, at 419.
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dispute resolution processes that screen out the strongest cases,
leaving only the weakest to proceed to arbitration.o7 0 Another
possibility, which also has empirical support, is that employers who
have suffered defeat in litigation - or avoided such defeat by agreeing
to a settlement17 ' - have changed their procedures in order to reduce
the likelihood of future litigation. Despite all of these potential
explanations for lower-paid employees' experience in employment
arbitration, it is also possible that employer-mandated employment
arbitration has developed a structure that works to the disadvantage
of employees. And it is almost certain that the numbers uncovered by
Professor Colvin provided additional ammunition to critics of
employment arbitration skeptical of the impartiality of a mandatory,
employer-controlled process that delivers low employee win rates
and low damage awards.17 2
In the securities arbitration area, as well, there has been cause for
concern for consumers (or customers). Evidence indicates that

170 See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment ArbitrationBefore and
After the Due Process ProtocolforMediation andArbitration of StatutoryDisputes
Arising Out ofEmployment: PreliminaryEvidence that Self-Regulation Makes a
Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON

LABOR 303, 323, tbl.2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004); Elizabeth
Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration:A FairForum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J.,
May/July 2003, at 9; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study
ofEmployment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 777, 807-08 (2003).
'17See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy
Research Programon Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 101, 112-13
(explaining that USPS national mediation program was part of the settlement of a
racial discrimination class action). USPS managers report that they have improved
in their ability to deal with issues with their employees, primarily by being more
willing to listen. See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects
from Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some PreliminaryEvidencefrom the

USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601, 607-08 (1997).

172 Although he also has referenced similar data, Professor David Schwartz
urges that the data ultimately do not matter in determining whether or not
mandatory arbitration is fair. Schwartz, MandatoryArbitrationandFairness,supra
note 24, at 1340- 41. Instead, he points out that both those who impose mandatory
arbitration clauses and those who resist them consistently behave as though
mandatory arbitration is not fair; thus the process is not fair. Id.
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customers' win rates have declined, as have their recovery rates.173
Customers fare particularly poorly when facing large brokerage firms
or when their arbitrators are attorneys who represent brokerage firms
or brokers in other arbitrations.' 74 Research also has shown that the
selection of pro-industry arbitrators has increased.17 1
Within this area, however, the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA)176 and the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration (SICA) have been admirably proactive. In a report
commissioned by SICA, Professors Jill Gross and Barbara Black
described perceptions of arbitral partiality among customers.' 7 7 Even
though a strong majority of customers and "non-customers" (i.e.,
primarily industry representatives) responding to a survey perceived
that their arbitration panels were competent to resolve the disputes
before them,'17 the research also revealed significant divergences
between customers and non-customers in securities arbitration. 7 9
Customers were much less likely than non-customers to perceive the
arbitration panel as open-minded (28% vs. 49%),18 much less likely
to perceive the arbitration panel as impartial (25% vs. 48%),181 and,
ultimately, much less likely to view the arbitration process as fair
173See

Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, PerceptionsofFairnessofSecurities
Arbitration:An EmpiricalStudy 5 (Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law, Pub. Law &
Research Paper Series, No. 08-01, 2008) [hereinafter Gross & Black, Perceptions
ofFairness].
174 See id.
1" See id. at 6.

According to its website, FINRA is "the largest independent regulator for
all securities firms doing business in the United States." Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRAlindex.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009). The organization was established in July 2007 with the
consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and "the
member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the New York Stock
Exchange." Id.
"nSee Gross & Black, Perceptions ofFairness,supra note 173; Jill I. Gross &
Barbara Black, When PerceptionChanges Reality: An EmpiricalStudy of
Investors' Views of the FairnessofSecurities Arbitration,2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349
[hereinafter Gross & Black, When Perception ChangesReality].
1I See Gross & Black, When Perception Changes Reality, supra note 177, at
383.
'79 Id. at 387-89.
80
See id. at 385.
181 See id.
176
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(27.84% vs. 50.64%).182 Indeed, 60% of customers disagreed with
the statement "I have a favorable view of securities arbitration for
customer disputes,"' and 61% disagreed with the statement that
"arbitration was fair for all parties."l 84 The customers' skepticism
regarding arbitrators' open-mindedness and impartiality makes it
unsurprising that they also doubted the arbitration process's fairness.
Participants with recent experience in a civil court case also were
asked to compare the fairness of securities arbitration with the
fairness of the court process. A whopping 75.55% of customers
found that arbitration was "very unfair" (62.96%) or "somewhat
unfair" (12.59%) when compared with their court experience.18 5
Following this and other empirical research referenced earlier,
FINRA has begun changing the procedures used for selecting
securities arbitrators. 186
Procedural justice research and theory easily explain the
divergence in perceptions between the securities customers and noncustomers/industry representatives, as well as the skepticism
displayed by other critics of mandatory arbitration in the consumer
and employment contexts. Four process characteristics reliably
predict perceptions of fairness: (1) the opportunity for people to tell
their stories ("voice"); (2) demonstrated consideration of these stories
by the decisionmaker ("being heard"); (3) the involvement of a
decisionmaker who is trying to be open-minded and fair; and (4)
dignified, respectful treatment. 87 Perhaps because people realize that
these procedural characteristics can be manipulated, they tend to be
182

See id. at 378.

' See id. at 390 n.119.
'4 See id. at
185See id.

390.

186See New Securities ADR PilotLaunches, Allowing Industry Arbitrator
Removal, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 191, 191 (noting FINRA's

adoption of a pilot program that allows investors to elect arbitrator panel consisting
entirely of public arbitrators, thus excluding any industry arbitrator).
1'

See Nancy A. Welsh, PerceptionsofFairness,in THE NEGOTIATOR'S

FIELDBOOK 165, 169 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2006) [hereinafter Welsh, PerceptionsofFairness];Nancy A. Welsh,
Remembering the Role ofJustice in Resolution: Insightsfrom Proceduraland
Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 52 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh,
Making Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820-21 (2001).

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

534

30-2

on high alert for "sham" procedures. 1 8 The arbitrations described
supra are conducted pursuant to contracts that are written by the
repeat players, with arbitration clauses inserted by the repeat players,
with arbitrators coming from the repeat players' industry or trade
associations or from ADR firms that must solicit the repeat players'
business. The one-sided nature of these circumstances is likely to
raise doubts regarding the likelihood of real consideration from
arbitrators who are open-minded and fair.
Procedural justice matters because if people perceive a dispute
resolution or decision-making process as procedurally fair, they also
are more likely to perceive the outcome as substantively fair.'8 9
Perceptions of procedural justice also strongly influence compliance
and perceptions of the legitimacy of the institution that provides or
sponsors the process.' 9 0 Why do people care so much about
procedural justice? First, people want to be reassured that the
decisionmaker had access to and considered the information needed
to make a good, fair decision. If the decisionmaker had and
considered the information, then the outcome is more deserving of
trust and respect. Second, procedures themselves communicate
whether the people using the procedures are deserving of respect. If
the neutral in a dispute resolution process listens to the disputants
before him or her and consistently demonstrates both respect and a
sincere attempt to be open-minded, these behaviors signal to the
disputants that they are valued members of the group, regardless of
whether that group is a nation, a local community, or a workplace.' 9 '
Refusal to listen or closed-mindedness signals a lack of respect.
More recent research has revealed that people who find
themselves in situations that accentuate hierarchy and unequal status
- situations that then trigger strong suspicions that scarce resources
will be allocated on the basis of identity-based status rather than
situation-specific meritl 9 2 - are even more likely to notice if they are

" See Welsh, PerceptionsofFairness,supra note 187, at 170.
See id.
See id.
191See id. at 170-71.
189

190

Though I am clearly privileging one of these bases for the allocation of
resources, I recognize that both can be viewed as grounded in equity. See Welsh,
Perceptions ofFairness,supra note 187, at 166.
192
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treated in a procedurally just manner.1 93 Again, the one-sided nature
of many of the structural characteristics of consumer, employment,
and securities arbitration strongly suggests the presence of hierarchy
and the potential for inequality - i.e., that nothing should be taken for
granted when it comes to the fairness of the dispute resolution
procedure or its result.
This cursory description of procedural justice research and
theory, along with the data that have emerged from consumer,
employment, and securities arbitration, reveal why consumer and
employee advocates, along with academics and some ADR
advocates, have raised concerns about the existence and
consequences of structural bias among embedded neutrals. However,
it has been relatively easy for courts to brush aside these objections
as the overblown fantasies of people who like to complain or the
frivolous objections of those who are attempting to avoid an
inevitable loss on the merits.194

m9See id. at 170; Jody Clay-Warner, PerceivingProceduralInjustice: The
Effects of Group Membership andStatus, 64 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 224 (2001);
Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Does FairnessMatter More to Some Than to Others?
The ModeratingRole of Workplace Status on the Relationship Between Procedural
FairnessPerceptionsandJob Satisfaction, 20 Soc. JUST. RES. 161, 163 (2007);
Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., ProceduralJustice and IntragroupStatus:
Knowing Where We Stand in a Group EnhancesReactions to Procedures,41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 664 (2005).
194 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 634 (1985) (declining "to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious, and impartial arbitrators"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d
109 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming lower court's refusal to enforce arbitration provision
based on repeat-player effect, finding that plaintiff had failed to show any facts that
AAA or its arbitrators were biased); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975
(2d Cir. 1996) (same); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
1998) (reaching same); see also Miller v. Equifirst Corp., No. 2:00-0335, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 5, 2006). The Plaintiff argued that the
fee-per-case system used by NAF creates incentive for NAF arbitrators to rule in
favor of lenders to garner repeat business. Id. The court also pointed to NAF
solicitation materials flaunting close ties to financial services industry and lawyers,
as well as amicus briefs filed by NAF to support lenders' arguments. Id. The court,
in denying the plaintiff's argument, stated that the NAF procedures included
adequate protections for those who were not repeat players including "prior to the
selection of the arbitrator, the names and qualifications of potential arbitrators are
provided to the party ... [,] the arbitrator is required to be _neutral and
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independent' . . . [, and] in the arbitrator selection process each party has one

peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause." Id. The court also
pointed to a number of other decisions which have similarly found that the NAF is
not biased in favor of repeat players including Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Marsh v. First USA Bank, NA., 103 F. Supp. 2d
909 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Hutcherson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 898
(Ill. 2003). Id.; see also MLDX Invs., Inc. v. Parse, No. 2:06-CV-00121 PGC, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36613, at *22 (D. Utah June 1, 2006) (finding that "there has
been no showing that such [NASD/NYSE] arbitration panels disproportionately
favor brokers"). California courts repeatedly cite Mercurio for the proposition that
the repeat-player effect is not enough by itself to find an arbitration agreement
unconscionable. See Imagistics Int'l, Inc. v. Dep't of General Servs., 150 Cal. App.
4th 581 (2007) (finding no showing of the oppressive procedural unconscionability
present in Mercurio); Hogan v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. Al 13160, 2007 Cal. App.
LEXIS 4651 (June 11, 2007) (finding no evidence to refute Nordstrom's contention
that the AAA has thousands of arbitrators that can be called to arbitrate any given
dispute); Husky v. Hollywood Entm't Corp., No. H029401, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS
5752 (June 30, 2006) (noting that concerns in Mercuro not present); Meoli v.
AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. A106061, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 4366 (May 18,
2005); Belinsky v. BPM Goldman Fin. Design, LLC, No. A104645, 2004 Cal.
App. LEXIS 10595 (Nov. 18, 2004) (finding no factual showing for the court to
find a "repeat player effect"); McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 109 Cal.
App. 4th 76 (2003) (finding no evidence that the NASD/NYSE rules regarding
disclosure garner a "repeat player effect"). Under New York law, in a former
partner's action to recover retirement benefits from the partnership, the trial court
correctly concluded that it did not have sufficient information to conclude that an
arbitration panel that included two members of the board of directors and three
other partners would be biased. BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee, 970 So. 2d 869, 877
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). With respect to the provision of arbitrators, under New
York law, "parties may not complain merely because the arbitrators named were
known to be chosen with a view to a particular relationship to their nominator or to
the subject-matter of the controversy." Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 182
N.E.2d 85, 89 (N.Y. 1962). In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit
Authority, the court noted:
[I]t has long been the policy of New York courts to interfere as little
as possible with the freedom of consenting parties, '[t]herefore, strange as
it may seem ... a fully known relationship between an arbitrator and a
party, including one as close as employer and employee .. . will not in and
of itself disqualify the designee.'
623 N.E.2d 531, 534 (N.Y. 1993). The court found the designation of an
employee of one of the parties as the arbitrator of disputes not to be substantively
unconscionable. Id. Relying on Westinghouse, the court in Greenwald v.
Weisbaum, 785 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), upheld the validity and
enforceability of the BDO arbitration provision. The court noted:
The arbitration provision safeguards the arbitration proceeding by
requiring the panel to consist primarily of non-Board Members and that no
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The objections became more difficult to brush aside, however,
after Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson filed a state court
complaint' 9 5 in 2009 against the National Arbitration Forum (NAF).
An analysis of that case, as described in the Minnesota complaint, 196
will provide the opportunity to test the application of the rule
emerging from Caperton to a situation involving an embedded
neutral.
97
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUMI

NAF, a for-profit corporation, was founded in Minnesota in
1986.198 NAF received very substantial business from credit-card
member can be from the same office as the complaining partner, nor be
otherwise involved in the controversy or dispute. Additionally, since every
partner of BDO may be compelled in the future to arbitrate a dispute
before such a panel, this dramatically illustrates that there is certainly a

reasonable expectation that the arbitration will not be unfair.
Id. at 670. The Connecticut Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in
Hottle v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 846 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2004), applying New York
law. Both cases distinguished an earlier case, Cross & Brown Co. v. Nelson, 167
N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957), on which Bee relies; see also Roger J.
Perlstadt, Timing ofInstitutionalBias Challenges to Arbitration,69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1983 (2002) (urging that institutional bias objections should be allowed to be raised
early).
'95 See Complaint, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
196 This Article will use allegations made against NAF and statements made in
deposition testimony as if they are true. This Article is not asserting the truth of
such allegations or statements. Instead, the allegations and statements are being
used to consider the potential application of Capertonto embedded neutrals. In a
sense, the approach taken by this Article is consistent with the Supreme Court
instruction to trial courts in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). When confronted with motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, judges must assume that the allegations are true
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. They must then
determine whether the allegations present a plausible cause of action-not just a
conceivable claim, but a plausible claim. This Article takes the same approachaccepting the Minnesota complaint's allegations as true and then determining
whether they present a plausible claim under the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court most recently in Caperton.
'" Or egregious tip of the iceberg? My thanks to Christopher Honeyman for
suggesting this different perspective in his comments to a different article involving
similarly creative parties.
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companies, as well as mortgage lenders, retailers that make loans to
purchasers of their products, debt buyers, and cell phone
companies.19 9 NAF solicited this business and - according to
allegations contained in the Minnesota complaint - made some of the
following claims to persuade repeat players to insert mandatory
arbitration clauses in their boilerplate agreements:
[Benefits of arbitration include a] marked increase in recovery
rates over existing collection efforts. (PowerPoint
presentation to bank.) 200
*The customer does not know what to expect from
Arbitration and is more willing to pay.
*They [customers] ask you to explain what Arbitration is
then basically hand you the money.
*You have all the leverage and the customer really has
little choice but to take care of this account. 201
It is unclear when these representations allegedly were made and
by whom. Nonetheless, by 2006, NAF had become this country's
largest provider of consumer debt arbitration services, handling
214,000 claims in that year alone. 202
Accretive LLC, a private equity firm, approached NAF in 2006
and apparently expressed its interest in some form of partnering.2 0 3
Accretive officials communicated to NAF that they saw the ADR
organization as having the "potential to blossom into a billion-dollar

'" Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.

1
2009).
200
20 1

202

Complaint at 5, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
Id. 95.

Id.T96.

Id.
203 It is unclear who initiated this contact. In a November 20, 2008 e-mail from
Mike Kelly of NAF to Madhu Tadikonda of Accretive, Kelly indicates that
Accretive will need to pay "[a] non-refundable fee to take us off the market during
negotiations." E-mail from Michael Kelly, CEO, Nat'l Arbitration Forum, to
Madhu Tadikonda, Gen. Partner, Accretive Tech. Partners, LLC (Nov. 20, 2008)
(on file with author). This suggests that NAF had positioned itself as a target for
acquisition or merger.
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business." 2 0' Further, they perceived that "[b]y expanding beyond
credit-card disputes to resolving disagreements between hospitals and
patients, NAF had the potential to be 'the center of a broad
arbitration ecosystem .... .205
According to the Minnesota complaint, NAF was interested, but
some of its officials worried about the repercussions if its relationship
with Accretive became public. By e-mail (attached to the complaint),
Mike Kelly, NAF's chief operating officer, recommended "that any
Accretive stake in NAF be acquired through 'a new fund as the
investment vehicle' [and that] there should be 'no public information
connecting Accretive with the fund that ultimately acquires and holds
the minority interest' in NAF. '206 Accretive and NAF signed a letter
of intent in 2007.207 In response to Kelly's concerns, Accretive
formed several wholly-owned entities called Agora which then paid
$42 million for a 40% ownership stake in a new company,
Forthright. 208 NAF took a 58.3% stake in the company. 20 9 NAF and
Agora also entered into an agreement giving Agora the right to
appoint two of the members of Forthright's five-person board.2 10
NAF's in-house counsel became in-house counsel for Forthright.2 1 1
Pursuant to a Services Agreement required by Accretive's
principals, Forthright then took over most of the tasks involved in
administering arbitrations and mediations.2 1 2 One task that clearly
204
205

Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
Id.

206

id.

207

Complaint at 18, State v. Nat'1 Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,

2009).
Id.
See id. at 15, State v. Nat'1 Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009). The remaining 1.7% are allegedly in endowments of major academic
institutions. Id. at 32 (reporting that an NAF spokesperson said: "Following its
spin-out from the FORUM, interested investors acquired a noncontrolling, passive,
minority position in Forthright. These several investors are primarily high networth individuals and endowments of major academic institutions.") I thank my
colleague Lance Cole for pointing out that even though Agora appeared to play an
influential role, it demanded only a minority share of Forthright and thus was not in
legal210
control of the company.
Id. at 22.
208

209

211 Id. at 17.

212

Id. at 14.
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remained with NAF was the retention of the neutrals.2 13 It is less
clear whether NAF or Forthright was responsible for paying the
neutrals 2 14 and administering the process of selecting neutrals for
cases. In return for these administrative services, NAF paid
Forthright a "monthly seven-figure fee and a 'success fee' based on a
formula related to the amount of revenue received by NAF." 2 15
According to the complaint, "95 percent of [NAF's] revenue" went to
Forthright "after direct-arbitrator (mediator) costs." 2 16 Agora,
Accretive, and its principals appear to have profited directly from the
arbitrations conducted by NAF based on revenues generated by the
Services Agreement and its ownership of Forthright. Forthright thus
served as a vehicle for Accretive's investment in NAF while
permitting Accretive to avoid direct involvement in the provision of
arbitration services.
NAF's concern about concealing Accretive's investment likely
was motivated by Accretive's simultaneous decision to invest in
another company engaged in consumer debt collection. Specifically,
Accretive entered into a financial relationship with employees of
Mann Bracken, a large debt-collection law firm.2 17 This firm
represented credit-card companies in a large percentage of NAF's
arbitrations involving collection actions against consumers.2 18
Accretive joined with members of the Mann Bracken firm to create
Axiant LLC.2 19 Mann Bracken contributed most of its assets and
liabilities associated with telephone collections service operations,
"including non-attorney personnel," to Axiant. 220 Accretive owned
68.7% of Axiant, while the Mann Bracken firm members owned
31.3%.221

213

Id. at 16.

214

See id. at 15; see also Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
Complaint at 16, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,

215

2009).
216

217

218
219

Id.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 10.

Id. at 2.
22 0
1 d. at 25.
221

Id. at 11, 17, 24-25, 27-28.
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In a very real sense, with these two investments, Accretive had
created a vertically integrated dispute resolution business. 22 2 Creditcard companies brought their collection matters to Mann Bracken,
which attempted debt collection. If that did not work, Mann Bracken
lawyers referred the cases to NAF for arbitration. According to the
Minnesota complaint, in some instances, NAF even helped to draft
claims against consumers. 223 NAF/Forthright referred the cases to
NAF's arbitrators, who then conducted arbitration proceedings.
NAF's arbitrators found for the credit-card companies nearly 95% of
the time. The credit-card companies then turned to the courts, which
transformed the arbitral awards into judgments. Axiant then took
over and proceeded to collect on these judgments. Arbitration had
become just another part of the debt collection business.
Importantly, NAF created a "Chinese wall" (now known as a
"screen" 224) to protect its arbitration services from contact with the
operations conducted by Forthright/Mann Bracken. 225 NAF's chief
operating officer also established separate office spaces - though
perhaps in the same building - for these operations, with secure key-

222 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 194-95 (1978)
(defining vertical integration as the "inclusion within a single firm of two or more
stages in the production and distribution of an end-product"); JAMES WALKER &
DOUGLAS FERGUSON, THE BROADCAST TELEVISION INDUSTRY 214 (1998)
(defining vertical integration as "[a]n industry in which the owners of the means of
production also own the means of distribution"); Note, ChallengingConcentration
of Control in the American Meat Industry, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2643, 2644 n.10
(2004) (citing HENRY A. WALLACE CNT. FOR AGRIC. & ENVTL. POL'Y AT
WINROCK INT'L, MAKING CHANGES: TURNING LOCAL VISIONS INTO NATIONAL

SOLUTIONS: AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AGRICULTURE POLICY PROJECT 11 (2001) (defining
vertical integration in agriculture as "the coordination or ownership of various
levels of production, processing, and distribution of farm products under one
decisionmaking unit").
223 Complaint at 3, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
2009).
224 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2006) (describing
effective screening mechanisms); Id. R. 1.1 0(a)(2)(i) (requiring firm's timely

screening of lawyer who is disqualified from representing a client due to conflict of
interest, as well as no apportionment of fee received from such client).
225 Complaint at Exhibit 2, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed
July 14, 2009).
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card access and separate information-technology infrastructures. 226
He apparently concluded that these actions sufficiently removed any
potential conflicts of interest and permitted the relationship with
Accretive to proceed.
In July 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General brought her action
against NAF, relying on Minnesota statutes. 227 NAF quickly agreed
to end its consumer debt arbitration business. 228 Based on the
volume, flow, and timing of money detailed above, could the rule
emerging from Caperton provide a constitutional basis for attacking
NAF's arbitrators as insufficiently impartial - or as creating too strong
a probability of bias? Perhaps more usefully, could the reasoning in
Capertonbe used to erect more effective protections of both the
reality and the appearance of impartiality in the procedures involving
embedded neutrals?
A. Caperton'sPotentialApplication to NAF
1.A Necessary Tangent - The Necessity of State Action
It is essential to begin this discussion by noting that unlike the
situation in Caperton, which involved a West Virginia judge, it is not
certain that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would apply to actions taken by a for-profit corporation such as NAF
or by any of its individual, private arbitrators. The Due Process
Clause provides: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 229 The elements of a
due process claim thus include (1) deprivation, (2) by a state actor,
(3) of the life, liberty or property, (4) of a person, (5) without due
process of law. Caperton,and the cases upon which it relies,
establish that the last requirement can be met when a court concludes
that the amount and timing of financial contributions made to help
ensure the installation of a judge will, as an objective matter, present

226
227

2009).
228

229

See Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
Complaint at 3, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July 14,
Mollenkamp et al., supra note 46, at A20.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1
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too great a risk of tempting the average man not to hold the balance
"nice, clear and true." 230
The difficulty here is that the Due Process Clause - like other
requirements of the Constitution - generally does not apply to private
parties. In other words, private action generally does not need to meet
the requirements of due process. 23 1 NAF is a private party, providing
individual arbitrators who conduct arbitrations in private contract
disputes and issue arbitral awards to individual consumers and forprofit corporations. On the face of these events, there is no state
action or state actor involved.
Professors Jean Stemlight, Richard Reuben, and others have
argued, however, that consistent judicial enforcement - and even
encouragement - of mandatory arbitration clauses, along with
consistent judicial enforcement of arbitral awards, implicate the
public function and entanglement exceptions to the state action
doctrine. 232 Under the circumstances that characterize today's
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255 (2009) (quoting
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972))
231 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
232 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairnessin Securities Arbitration:A
ConstitutionalMandate?, 26 PACE L. REv. 73, 76 (2005) [hereinafter Cole,
Fairnessin Securities Arbitration] (arguing that "the SEC's involvement in the
SRO arbitration process transforms the private SROs that directly administer the
arbitration process into state actors for purposes of arbitration"); Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577, 615-19 (1997); Richard C. Reuben,
ConstitutionalGravity:A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 994-1009 (2000) (explaining public
function and entanglement exceptions, applying them to "private" ADR procedures
and urging that state action should be found in the event of "statutory delegation of
a traditionally exclusive public function or the partnership of public and private
actors in facilitating unconstitutional conduct") [hereinafter Reuben, Constitutional
Gravity]; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof the Supreme
Court'sPreferencefor BindingArbitration:A Fresh Assessment ofJury Trial,
SeparationofPowers, andDue Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1, 40-47
(1997) (arguing that state action exists at least to the extent legislatures and courts
are relying on a preference for arbitration over litigation to interpret the validity
and scope of arbitration agreements). But see In re National Arbitration Forum
Trade Practices Litigation, No. Civ. 09-1939, 2010 WL 605710 (D. Minn. Feb. 22,
2010) (granting defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss due process claim, based on
finding that "NAF is a private entity" and though "[i]t may have been engaged in
230
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enforcement of arbitration clauses and awards, the line between the
public justice system and private dispute resolution is difficult to
discern. 233 As Professor Sarah Cole recently pointed out, it is even
more difficult to establish a public-private divide when a public
regulatory body plays a significant role in the operations of an

quasi-judicial functions ... that does not mean it is a state actor"); Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Arbitrationand State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1 (arguing against state
action). Professor Larry Backer has recently linked sovereign immunity and state
action:
Thus, sovereign immunity is criticized because it preserves a space in
law where the apparatus of state is not treated like other objects of law
(the common citizen or legal subject), and state action is criticized for
insulating individuals and other non-state entities from obligations
otherwise imposed on the state. There is a strong principle of levelling, of
horizontal equity, inherent in these criticisms. The criticisms also mark a
strong mutation of rule of law notions to one that suggests a substantive
governance component of equal treatment and equal obligation among
public and private entities. Perhaps also, the criticisms suggest the ways in
which the state has ceased to be "special" and different. This last point is
especially powerful in the context of the recent push to privatize
traditional governmental functions either by delegation (through contract)
or by leaving areas of behavior regulation to the "market."
Larry Backer, On State Action and Sovereign Immunity, LAW AT THE END OF
THE DAY, June 11, 2007, http://1cbackerblog.blogspot.com/2007/06/on-state-actionand-sovereign-immunity.html.
233 Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-ConnectedMediation in a Democratic
Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117 (2004). Richard Reuben urges
that
[A] unitary theory of public civil dispute resolution joins trial and
some of what is now called private ADR into a single system of
interrelated dispute resolution processes, with the intensity of
constitutional force decreasing the further removed the dispute resolution
process becomes from the purview of the government. This constitutional
force, or gravity, is determined by reference to the nature of the ADR
process, the nature of the constitutional values at risk in the process, and
the coerciveness of the role of the state in that process.
Reuben. ConstitutionalGravity, supra note 232, at 1047. There also seems to
be increasing fuzziness in the relationship between our "justice" system (formerly
understood as public and dominated by the courts) and "risk management" system
(formerly understood as private and dominated by insurers). See Nancy A. Welsh, I
CouldHave Been a Contender: The PotentialEffects ofTwombly and Iqbal on
Pre-LitigationNegotiation and Other Forms ofEarly, ConsensualDispute
Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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industry and its resolution of disputes. 234 Rather than repeating the
arguments made by these colleagues and others on these points, this
Article will simply incorporate them by reference, just for the
purpose of creating the possibility that the Due Process Clause could
be applied directly to NAF and its arbitrators. 235 For the limited
purposes of this Article,2 3 6 then, we may either assume that the Due
Process Clause could be found to apply directly to NAF and its
operations through relevant exceptions to the state action doctrine, or
alternatively - and much less provocatively - we may adopt the

approach used by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 2 37 There, Justice Black observed
that he could "see no basis" for refusing to find in "the broad
statutory language [of the Federal Arbitration Act or FAA] that
governs arbitration proceedings" the "constitutional principle" of
impartiality applicable to courts.2 3 8 Thus, even if the Due Process

See Cole, Fairnessin Securities Arbitration,supra note 232, at 83-97.
235 1 will save for another day an exploration of case law interpreting federal
statutes, court rules, or judicial canons of ethics that might also reveal an approach
to safeguarding due process that is similar to the one taken by the majority in
Caperton.
236 And recognizing that others may quite legitimately disagree with a
relatively freewheeling approach to collapsing the public-private divide. See
generally Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity,supra note 232; Ellen Dannin,
Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization,Public-ization,and Public Values, 15
234

CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111 (2005).

393 U.S. 145 (1968). But see Linas Ledebur, PluralityRule: Concurring
Opinions and a DividedSupreme Court, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 899, 908 (2009)
(noting the Justice White's concurring opinion is cited much more frequently than
Justice Black's even though Justice White had also joined Justice Black's opinion).
238 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 148. Justice Black added:
It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business
world, since they are not expected to get all their income from their work
deciding cases, but we should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have
completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not
subject to appellate review.
Id. at 148-49; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008)
("The idea that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor
of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in the due
process context."). But see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.
633, 653-54 (1990) (noting that the Due Process Clause had not been specifically
237
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Clause does not apply directly, we may import its jurisprudence into
the FAA.
With this assumption in place, we are now ready to determine
whether NAF's corporate and financial structures resulted in a
situation in which an average NAF arbitrator would be
tempted "not to hold the balance nice, clear and
unconstitutionally
9

true."

23

2.Finding a Temptation That Is Unconstitutionally Strong
We will continue to assume, as we have thus far and for the
limited purpose of testing the potential application of Caperton to
embedded neutrals, that the allegations contained in the Minnesota
Attorney General's complaint are true. If we accept these allegations
as true, it is clear that very substantial money flowed into NAF from
Accretive, by way of Agora, and that Accretive personnel began to
play a significant role in NAF's governance, administration, business
development, marketing, and perhaps even its self-identity. It is also
clear that Agora personnel were given access to highly confidential
information about NAF's arbitration business, including data
regarding "claim volume and revenue trends, . . . finances, personnel,
judgment trends, [and] arbitrator credentials. "240 Finally, if we accept
the complaint's allegations as true, it seems reasonable to assume that
Accretive's profits were affected by the success of Axiant, its joint
venture with the law firm of Mann Bracken - and that Axiant's
success in performing its debt collection function depended upon
Mann Bracken's success in acquiring arbitral awards. 24 ' Though the
Minnesota complaint describes a complex web of corporate
structures and financing, it is clear that Accretive was affiliated
financially and in terms of governance with NAF, and that Accretive
also had a direct financial interest in ensuring that the arbitrations
conducted by NAF assisteddebt collection. The relevant question,
though, is not whether Accretive would have been able to hold the
invoked and that the statute at issue did not specifically require the procedural
protections
being demanded by LTV).
239
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2255 (2009).
240 Complaint at 18-19, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum (D. Minn. filed July
14, 2009).
24 1

Id. at 29-31.
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balance nice, clear and true. Our focus is on the ability of the
individual NAF arbitrator to maintain that balance.
It seems quite likely, meanwhile, that Accretive and Agora
influenced NAF. As noted above, Agora was able to appoint two of
the five directors on Forthright's board, and Forthright became the
entity that collected the income, paid the expenses, and distributed
58.7% of the net profits to NAF's principals. In 2006, Mann Bracken,
whose employees were partial owners of Axiant (along with
Accretive), was responsible for over 50% of the consumer debt
collection arbitration claims that resulted in filings, income, and net
profits for NAF's principals.2 42 In addition, Accretive/Agora
principals fed NAF's dreams and ambitions. Accretive/Agora
"promised to 'launch' the Forum into new lines of business";24 3
described NAF as "sitting at the center of a broad arbitration
ecosystem"; 2 " helped NAF principals imagine "arbitration expanding
to become a comprehensive, alternative legal system"; 245 discussed at
a Forthright board meeting "methods to increase the number of large
batch claims being processed by arbitrators, and changes in the
process that would provide filers access to working capital"; 246
assisted NAF in developing bids for new business; 247 and invested
$42 million in NAF. 248 Even though ADR has become a big business,
$42 million is still a lot of money. It seems quite likely that with
Accretive's encouragement, NAF began (or continued) to evolve
from a company that modeled itself after the courts - an image that
remained dominant in the representations on the company's
website 249 - to one that had re-imagined itself as a successful and
efficient business focused on a profitable, high-volume segment of
the dispute resolution market. That change in self-image likely
resulted in a change in values and normative anchors. 250
242
243

Id. at 29.
Id. at 13.

244 Id.
245 Id. Exhibit

246

1 ("NAF-Strategic Vision").

1 d. at 23.
247
1 d. at 24.
248 Id. at 2.
249 Id. at 7-9.
250

See Jill M. Purdy & Barbara Gray, ConflictingLogics, Mechanisms of
Diffusion, andMultilevel Dynamics in EmergingInstitutionalFields, 52 ACAD.
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But does Accretive's investment of the "extraordinary" sum of
more than $42 million in NAF and its influence on the governance
and direction of the organization, occurring at about the same time
that Accretive invested heavily in the debt-collection industry, meet
the objective standard of creating a "probability of actual bias on the
part of' NAF that "is too high to be constitutionally tolerable?" 251
This question is also not the relevant question to be answered, at least
not at this point in the Article. The focus in Capertonwas not on the
West Virginia court as a whole and whether it was likely to be biased
as a result of the support it received from a particular individual or
set of interests.2 52 Instead, the focus in Caperton was on the strength
of such influence upon an individualjustice.253 Was his refusal to
recuse himself constitutionally suspect because of the source and
timing of the campaign contributions that helped him to gain
something he coveted - a seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals?

J. 355 (2009) (describing stages of evolution of emerging fields and diffuse
actors' selective use and exploitation of ideas that serve their own interests).
251 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
252 This is an important question, however, and one that deserves (and will
receive) closer study.
253 This focus is consistent with the general notion that the "culture" of the
U.S. tends to be individualistic rather than collectivist. See JEAN M. BRETT,
NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: How To NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND
MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 32-34 (2007); Kwok Leung &
Michael W. Morris, Justice Through the Lens of Cultureand Ethnicity, in
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw 348 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton
eds., 2001) ("[I]ndividualism refers to a tendency to put a stronger emphasis on
one's personal interest and goals, whereas collectivism refers to a stronger
emphasis on the interests and goals of one's in-group members."); Geert Hofstede,
The CulturalRelativity of OrganizationalPracticesand Theories, J. INT'L Bus.
STUD., Fall 1983, at 75 (finding the U.S. in an extremely high position on the
individualism scale). There are very significant variations within American society,
however, depending upon the in-groups and subcultures with which individual
Americans identify. See Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the
Self-Implicationsfor Cognition,Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 224,
229 (1991) ("[E]ven in American culture, there is a strong theme of
interdependence that is reflected in the values and activities of many of its
subcultures."); Welsh, PerceptionsofFairness,supra note 187, at 167 (observing
that collectivists' negotiation choices will depend upon characteristics of the
particular contexts in which they are making these choices).
MGMT.
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Thus, the Caperton analysis requires us to examine the individual
arbitrator and assess the probabilitythat NAF's reliance on the repeat
business of credit-card companies and its financial connection to the
debt collection industry - through Accretive and its various
investment vehicles - would have affected the arbitrator'sability to
hold the balance nice, clear and true. But Caperton also poses a
limitation in making this inquiry: it establishes an objective, not a
subjective, standard for the violation of due process. We are not
examining the character of any particular NAF arbitrator or even the
character of all of those on NAF's panel, just as Caperton did not
examine the character of Justice Benjamin or the character of any
other particular justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.
Therefore, we must consider whether NAF's reliance on the
repeat business of credit-card companies and Accretive's $42 million
investment and roles in NAF's operations was likely to affect the
average man's ability to hold the balance nice, clear and true. That
brings us to several questions. Did NAF arbitrators rely on the
organization for a substantial share of their income? Is there evidence
that NAF arbitrators were aware or had reason to be aware of the
company's solicitations of credit-card companies and other repeat
players? Is there evidence that NAF arbitrators were aware or had
reason to be aware of Accretive/Agora's role and influence? What
were the NAF "judgment trends" that Accretive/Agora examined as
part of its due diligence when deciding whether to invest in NAF?
Did NAF arbitrators know that NAF was tracking their judgment
trends? Why did NAF gather information about judgment trends?
Perhaps most importantly, did NAF do anythingdifferently in
referring cases to arbitratorsas a result of its assessment of those
judgment trends? Finally, who managed the administrative task of
determining which arbitrators would receive referrals - and thus
receive the resulting fees?
No information from the Minnesota complaint answers any of
these questions. Public Citizen's report, however, has information
regarding the volume of cases handled by some NAF arbitrators. 254
According to that report, during the approximate four-year period
between January 1, 2003, and March 31, 2007, NAF's ten busiest

254 PUBLIC CITIZEN,

supranote 142, at 16.
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arbitrators heard between 699 and 1332 credit-card cases. 25 5 They
may also have heard other types of cases, but that information was
unavailable. This volume of cases suggests the possibility of some
reliance on income from NAF and, thus, the potential for a reduced
ability to maintain independence and impartiality. Some people now
make a very good living serving primarily as neutrals. If NAF had
required exclusivity or a non-compete agreement from its neutrals,
both common sense and relevant socio-psychological research
regarding the influence of group membership upon individual human
beings256 would suggest an increased likelihood that an average
person serving as an NAF arbitrator could find his or her judgment
affected by NAF's business needs and aspirations. It is not clear,
however, that the money involved here would affect an average
man's or woman's judgment enough to be viewed by the current
Supreme Court as "constitutionally [in]tolerable."
Public Citizen's allegations regarding NAF arbitrators' knowledge
of NAF's solicitation of business from credit-card companies and
NAF's reliance on such referrals for a significant share of its business
were widely publicized within the dispute resolution community and,
more broadly, in the business community. It thus seems likely that
NAF arbitrators would have known about such concerns.2 57 In
contrast, there is no evidence that NAF's arbitrators were aware or
had reason to be aware of Accretive/Agora's extraordinary
investment in NAF or of its role in NAF's operations. Indeed, given
the care and cleverness with which NAF, Accretive, and Mann
Bracken disguised their corporate and financial relationship, there is
255

Id. But see E-mail from Mark Fellows, Legal Counsel, Forthright, to Nancy
Welsh, Professor, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law (April 21,
2010) (on file with author) (noting that "[a]verage FORUM arbitrator
compensation in 2008 equaled less than 5% of the national average annual salary of
an attorney with 15 years of practice experience").
256
See Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 166, 171-72 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000)
(describing social identity and its effects). E-mail from Mark Fellows, supra note
255 (explaining that the FORUM did not impose exclusivity requirements).
257
See Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks v. Consumers (Guess Who Wins),
Bus.WK., June 16, 2008, at 72; Nathan Koppel, ArbitrationFirm Faces Questions
Over Neutrality,WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A3; Roger S. Haydock, Letter to
the Editor, ArbitrationForum Is Fairand Balanced,WALL ST. J., May 3, 2008, at
A 10 (Haydock is the managing director of NAF); Serres, supra note 20, at 1D.
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every reason to presume that NAF arbitrators did not know about
this. Again, this suggests that the money involved and, more
importantly, its "temporal relationship" with an average person
serving as an NAF arbitrator was not enough to represent a
sufficiently "serious, objective risk of actual bias" to violate due
process. 258
Finally, Public Citizen reported the "noisy withdrawal" 59 of
Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Bartholet from the
organization, along with her concern about NAF's "apparent
systematic bias in favor of the financial services industry." 260 This
story was publicized widely within the dispute resolution community.
Bartholet's withdrawal provides additional guidance on whether the
flow of money into NAF - from Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken and
the credit-card companies - and this money's temporal relationship
with any particular NAF arbitrators or arbitrations should lead to a
finding of an unconstitutionally strong risk of biased decision-making
by an arbitrator.
Professor Bartholet is a longtime arbitrator. She has served on
labor and commercial panels for the AAA, MREP, JAMS-Endispute,
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, and,

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009).
A lawyer's "noisy withdrawal" from the representation of a client has long
been understood as ethical, under certain conditions. Its use became much more
problematic when the SEC incorporated the concept into the Sarbanes-Oxley bill.
See Lawyer Conductand CorporateMisconduct, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2227, 2244
n. 114 (2004) (citing George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer
Liabilityfor Failureto Prevent Harm to OrganizationalClients Through
258
25

Disclosureof Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 607 (1998)

("Rule 1.16, together with other provisions of the Model Rules and comments to
the Rules, has been interpreted to allow such 'noisy' withdrawal where the
lawyer's work product is being used or will be used to perpetrate a fraud.")); Susan
P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly'sDone: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1270 (2003) (arguing that noisy withdrawal is the ABA's
"own invention" and noting that Model Rule 1.6 has always "allowed a
withdrawing lawyer to disaffirm any document produced during the
representation"); DongJu Song, Note, The Laws ofSecurities Lawyering After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 DUKE L.J. 257, 260, 286, 278-79 (2003) (noting that
"comment 14 to [Model Rule 1.6] explicitly contemplates and permits giving
notice of a withdrawal and disaffirmance of opinions, documents, and
affirmations").
260 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 142, at 31.
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beginning in early 2003, for NAF. 2 6 1 In eighteen of nineteen creditcard arbitrations she received, she ruled for the credit-card company,
requiring the consumer to pay the money owed.26 2 In the nineteenth
case, Professor Bartholet dismissed the credit-card company's claim
on the merits.2 63 None of these arbitrations involved a hearing. Only
in the twentieth case that she arbitrated for NAF did the consumer
request a hearing and assert a counterclaim. 2 6 After the hearing and
considering "a fair number of papers" that the consumer submitted,
Professor Bartholet ruled against the credit-card company on its
claim and for the consumer on the counterclaim. 265 On March 5,
2004, she issued her decision ordering the credit-card company to
pay "$48,000 plus some" to the consumer. 26 6 Professor Bartholet
decided two more cases, to which she had been assigned long before,
neither involved a credit-card company as a party.26 7 And then, in the
next eleven cases to which she had been assigned, Professor
Bartholet received notices from NAF that it had either chosen to
remove her or the credit-card company had dismissed its collection
action. 26 8 She had never been removed before, 269 and not all of these
cases involved the credit-card company that had been a party to her
previous arbitrations. 270 Professor Bartholet was suspicious that her
$48,000 award in favor of the consumer in one case had been
disclosed to other credit-card companies and that these companies
were, as a result, choosing to avoid using her as an arbitrator. 27 1 in
addition, in at least three of the cases in which NAF chose to remove
Professor Bartholet, it reasoned that she had a "scheduling conflict."
Puzzled because she had never asserted such a conflict, Professor

261 Transcript of Deposition of Elizabeth Bartholet at 8-9, Carr v. Gateway,
No. 03-L-1271 (3d Cir. Ct. Ill. Dec. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Bartholet Deposition].
262 Id. at 21-22.
263 Id. at 22.
2

Id.

265

id.

266 Id.

at 22, 30.
267 Id. at 31.
26 8

1 d at 34.
Id. at 40.
27 0
Id at 117.
269

71

Id. at 118.
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Bartholet called a case administrator 27 2 at NAF "because the letter
was untrue and because [she] suddenly found herself disqualified." 273
Professor Bartholet described the conversation as follows:

Q: What did you and Miss Broberg discuss during
your call?
A: I told her about my concern that I felt I was
being removed based on the fact that I had decided
a single significant case against credit-card
company X after having decided a whole lot for
them which I knew was somewhere between one
and two dozen. I didn't know the exact number at
that time and I told her of my concern that this letter
was untrue and would be misleading to the parties.
This was a letter addressed to the parties and would
be misleading to the parties, particularly the creditor
[actually the debtor or consumer, per a clarification
later in the deposition] party who would be misled
as to the reason that I would not be hearing the case.

Q: Did Miss Broberg give you any reason why this
letter had been sent?
A: Yes, she did.

Q: What did she say?
[Various objections]
A: Say. In response to my statement that was
roughly do you think there could be any reason for
them disqualifying me other than the fact I ruled
against them in Case Y. She said no. She basically
agreed that that was the reason and in response to
my concern about this misleading letter about my
272
273

Id. at 45.

Id. at 38.
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unavailability having been sent out, she said that it
was a form letter that was simply regularly sent out
in all of the cases and it hadn't been - I mean the
implication was, therefore, it had not been done
particularly in this case. It was just a form letter that
was sent out in all the cases. 274
Professor Bartholet subsequently received a call from Colleen
Askvig, who she understood to be NAF's legal counsel, responsible
for supervising the case administrators. 275 Though Ms. Askvig
apparently thought that Professor Bartholet was concerned that
parties might be engaging in inappropriate "arbitrator-shopping,"
Professor Bartholet's "fairness" concerns actually revolved around
the danger of systemic, structural bias at NAF:
The fairness concern I expressed was that the repeat player credit
card company was allowed to eliminate an arbitrator that they found
coming out against them and that if that went on a repeated basis,
then you would be left with a panel of arbitrators that would be
systematically biased ... . With NAF[,] you have a repeat player
which you might have in certain court situations[,] but with NAF you
not only have the repeat player who at least in the cases I got was,
you know, the same repeat player engaged in debt collection ... you
also have a private system of justice where the arbitrators are not
elected or appointed for terms or for life as different state judges
274

Id. at 38-41. But see E-mail Attachment from Roger Haydock, Managing
Dir., Nat'l Arbitration Forum, to Jean Sternlight, Professor, UNLV Boyd School of
Law, Debunking Myths about Arbitrator Selection-Responding to Neely and
Bartholet (April 2, 2008) (on file with author). The e-mail attachment asserts that
erroneous notice documents were sent "purely as the result of a clerical mistake"
and were sent
on the same day by the same case coordinator who was new to the
FORUM. Fortunately, the proper documents notifying the parties that
Bartholet had been removed as arbitrator by the claimant were also mailed
to the appropriate parties... . Far from illustrating any systematic
manipulation, the Bartholet deposition transcript simply reports that she
was removed as an arbitrator under FORUM Rule 21(C) three times on
April 20, 2004-the sort of procedural maneuvering that has long been
practiced in the courts-and then an incorrect notice document was sent to
the responding parties by accident.
Id.
275 Bartholet Deposition, supra note 261, at 44.
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might differently be[,] but with arbitrators you have people for whom
to some degree the job of decision making is a job that they may or
may not get the next day, the next week, the next year as opposed to
judges who have regular business and regular salaries[,J so I argued
to her [Colleen Askvig], as I tried to argue to Kelly Broberg also, that
there was - that this preemptory challenge rule had the potential for
unfairness in a different way in the arbitration process and that NAF
was in a position to see that happening as I had seen it happen and to
do something about it in its rules by[,] for example[,] changing the
preemptory challenge process." 276
Professor Bartholet never arbitrated for NAF again. She sent a
letter of resignation to NAF as a result of her belief that NAF's
system was "systematically biased in favor of the credit card
companies .... 2 7 7 She did not know exactly what was going on, but
she felt she knew enough to remove - or in essence, recuse - herself

from future cases.2 78
276
277

Id. at 47, 116.
Id. at 15.

My colleague, Professor Ray Campbell, has suggested that, just as many
evolutionary processes can be understood in terms of game theory (i.e., if
organisms with a certain characteristic are more likely to survive in a given
challenging environment, that characteristic will tend to become dominant after a
very few iterations), NAF's or the credit-card companies' alleged selection of
arbitrators with particular characteristics also would be likely to impact the
arbitrator pool after a few iterations:
In the strong case, assume that NAF or some similar party only
selects arbitrators that bring in decisions in favor of the credit card
companies. Think of it as there being two kinds of arbitrators, which we
will call hawks (pro credit card companies) and doves (pro consumer) to
track the language of standard game theory .. . If the only strategy that
gets you to the next round is to be a hawk, pretty soon the dove gene
disappears .. . Note that this happens without consciousness on the part of
the hawks and doves that the game is being played. Now, think of a less
absolute game-let's say the hawk gene wins 95% of the time, and the
dove gene wins 5%. If you work through the game theory, at some mix
both genes survive, but one will predominate. The point is, it doesn't
matter that the arbitrators knew about NAF[']s relationship with the
collection agencies. What matters is that those selecting arbitrators knew,
and [allegedly] selected arbitrators with a bias.
E-mail from Ray Campbell to Nancy Welsh (Nov. 23, 2009) (on file with
author). This further suggests the need to deal with "garden variety" bias promptly
278
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What does Professor Bartholet's deposition testimony suggest
about the extent to which the average person would have been able to
continue to hold the balance nice, clear and true under the
circumstances presented? Professor Bartholet is not an average
woman. She is a Harvard Law School professor with substantial
experience as an arbitrator with other well-respected organizations
and with a national reputation in her field. She did not need her
relationship with NAF in order to be recognized, respected, and hired
as an arbitrator. And though nearly every academic feels underpaid, it
would be difficult to believe that she was desperate for the income
she could earn from NAF. How would the average man or woman, in
contrast to Professor Bartholet, have responded to repeated
misrepresentations in NAF's letters and the repeated decisions of
credit-card companies to dismiss their cases rather than appear before
him or her?
This is a close call - much closer than in the situation presented
by Caperton.And that is significant. Justice Kennedy repeatedly
emphasizes the "extraordinary" and "extreme" nature of Caperton's
events.2 7 9 It is a tale of epic greed and hubris. The tale of NAF and
Accretive/Agora may turn out to be a similarly salacious tale, but
NAF arbitrators did not know about these transactions among NAF,
Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken, and Axiant. Once the focus shifts to
the individual NAF arbitrator, the scale changes dramatically, at least
from the perspective of a third-party observer. And that is the
perspective that must be used when applying the objective standard
announced in Caperton.
Even though the allegations and testimony described in this
Article suggest that the average person arbitrating consumer creditcard disputes would have been tempted not to hold his or her balance
nice, clear and true, the risk of bias does not seem "overwhelming"
enough under Caperton to constitute an unconstitutional violation of
due process. And perhaps our inquiry should end there.

in certain settings because a laissez-faire response threatens to permit "exceptional"
bias to emerge fairly quickly, especially when there are large volumes of cases and
the turn-around time is short. Similarly, dominance of a particular gene will emerge
much more quickly in the insect world, characterized by extreme fecundity, than
among mammals, which tend to reproduce more slowly.
27 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
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However, Caperton was not the first case in which the Supreme
Court found that money, despite the indirectness of its flow, created a
constitutionally intolerable risk of bias. The Supreme Court has faced
this issue before, in a string of cases involving mayor-judges and
other administrative decisionmakers. This Article will now examine
these cases before reaching a final conclusion about the application
of Caperton's objective standard to an average man or woman
serving as an NAF arbitrator - or to NAF itself
IV. RECONSIDERING THE PRECEDENTIAL SHOULDERS UPON WHICH
CAPERTON STANDS

The recent due process cases arising out of the detention of
alleged enemy combatants in the War on Terror 280 showcase the
federal judiciary's struggle to maintain its role in response to attempts
by the legislature and executive to avoid the adjudicative function or
exercise this function themselves. 281 These cases could suggest that
the Constitution's protections should be invoked only in the event of
epic transgressions. The Supreme Court's earlier due process
jurisprudence, upon which Caperton stands, demonstrates that due
process protections should be invoked even in the face of mere
"garden variety" incidents of structural bias.
Caperton dealt with a judge on a state's highest court, but much
of the precedent upon which Justice Kennedy relied arose out of the
challenges presented by federal, state, or local administrators acting
essentially as trial judges. In an influential series of lectures
published as a book, Professor Roscoe Pound described adjudication
by such administrators as an affront to the spirit of the common
law.2 82 He viewed this form of adjudication as the embodiment of a
totally different theory of lawmaking, based on abstract theory and
28 0

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
281 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and
the Separation ofPowers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2107, 2149-50 (2009) ("More
generally, it might be impossible to understand the current structure of our judicial
system, and the limits on how it might be altered, without appreciating the
separation of powers concerns that arise when tribunals other than the Article III
courts are in a position to have the final say-and when access to the Article III
courts
is denied.").
282
See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
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application of bureaucratic rules, rather than grounded in careful and
customized analysis of complex human experience.2 83 Another
difference, of course, is that administrators' primary role requires
them to focus on their agency's chosen course of action and its
economic and political survival, while judges are supposed to be
shielded by tenure and temperament to be disinterested, impartial,
and focused on the needs of the cases and parties before them. 284
This Part examines due process concerns that have arisen
regarding adjudicators' ability to maintain sufficient disinterest and
impartiality in three related, but distinct, administrative settings: (1)
when it appears that an individualadministrator-judge may be
unconstitutionally biased as a result of his own pecuniary or personal
interests or his shared identity with the interests of his institution; (2)
when it appears that an entire administrativeadjudicativeentity may
be unconstitutionally biased as a result of the pecuniary or personal
interests of the entity itself or the shared pecuniary or personal
interests of the entity's individual members; and (3) when an
administrative entity has pecuniary or personal interests in its
allocation of benefits and has delegateddecision-making and the
adjudication of resulting disputes to private contractors.The first
category is, of course, most like Caperton,at least as the situation
was framed by Justice Kennedy. Justice Benjamin had a personal
interest in winning (and thus funding) his election campaign, and this
led to the perception that his decision was biased. The last category,
due to its outsourcing of the adjudicative function to private actors,
bears the greatest resemblance to the situation involving the creditcard industry, NAF and its arbitrators. All three categories of cases,
however, may provide additional guidance in considering the
application of due process requirements to NAF and its individual
arbitrators.

283

See id.

We know, of course, that this image is not-and probably never wasaccurate. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(establishing the courts' unique ability "to say what the law is").
284
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A. The Temptation of the IndividualAdministrator-JudgeNot to
Hold the Balance Nice, Clear,and True
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court confronted Ohio mayors
acting as judges pursuant to a state statute and effectively using their
role to supplement their own or their municipality's income. In
Tumey v. Ohio,285 the mayor-judge personally received a portion of
the fines he assessed for violations of the state's prohibition law. The
Supreme Court found this to be a clear violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the mayor had a
"direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against" each criminal defendant.2 8 6 The Court invoked
norms of judicial behavior, noting that "officers acting in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity" must excuse themselves if they have a
pecuniary interest. 287 Administrative adjudicators like this mayorjudge were to be held to the same standards as judges, and judges
were not permitted to have a pecuniary interest in the verdict.
As noted above, Tumey was the source of the language invoked
by Justice Kennedy in Capertonregarding the need to consider
whether organizational procedures or structures "offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the
accused." 28 8 Regarding the argument that the amount of money at
issue in the particular case before the court was relatively small and
thus undeserving of due process consideration, the Court opined:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such
consideration as $12 costs in each case to affect their
judgment in it, but the requirement of due process of law in
judicialprocedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of
the highest honor and the greatestself-sacrifice could carry it
on without danger of injustice.289
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 524.
287
Id. at 523.
285

286

288

Id. at 532 (quoted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252,
22652 (2009)).
89
Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, regardlessof the amount at issue, if administrators were
serving in an adjudicative role, they were obligated to behave like
judges and avoid the temptation of bias.
In 1928, just one year after Tumey was decided, the Court dealt
with a second Ohio mayor.2 90 Although this mayor also acted as a
judge pursuant to Ohio's statute, he was on a fixed salary and did not
receive direct compensation based on his decisions. 29 ' He also was
just one member of a five-person commission that exercised
legislative powers while the city manager exercised executive
powers. 292 Based on these circumstances, which helped to insulate
the mayor-judge from direct responsibility for the finances and fiscal
policies of the city, the Court determined that it could not presume
that this mayor would be unconstitutionally biased toward the
conviction of those who came before him as judge. 293
Many years passed before the next Ohio mayor appeared before
the Supreme Court. During that time, Congress established a vast
web of federal agencies to implement the New Deal, fight World War
II, and manage the home front. Congress also passed the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).2 94 To help protect the
impartiality of adjudicators in formal adjudicative proceedings, the
APA established certain salary and employment protections for
administrative law judges.2 9 5 In the midst of another growth spurt of
the administrative state in the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided
Goldberg v. Kelly, 296 which specifically identified an impartial
tribunal as an essential element of the due process to be provided by

290

29 1
292
29 3

Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).

Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.

1d. at 65.

294

See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
ProcedureAct Emergesfrom New Deal Politics,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557 (1996).
295 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 5362, 4301 (1978) (providing for separation of
adjudicative, investigative, and prosecutorial functions, removing agency control
over tenure and compensation decisions, and exempting ALJs from certain
performance ratings). The protections are not provided to hearing examiners or
other non-ALJs.
296 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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administrative agencies. 297 This element, however, was not the focus
of the case.
In 1972, in Ward v. Village ofMonroeville,2 98 the Supreme Court
dealt with its third Ohio mayor serving as a judge. Like the second
mayor, he did not receive any personal income from the fines he
assessed. 299 Also like the second mayor, he merely had an interest in
the financial health of his village.300 But this mayor was required to
"account[] annually to the [village] council respecting village
finances,"30 and "[a] major part of village income [was] derived
from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his
mayor's court."302 The evidence showed that between 1964 and 1968
such fines accounted for at least 35% and sometimes more than 50%
of the village's revenues.30 3 The mayor had even directed the chief of
police to charge suspects under village ordinances, rather than state
statutes, whenever possible in order to insure the flow of monies to
the village's coffers. 304 Despite this evidence, Ohio's Supreme Court
had found that the mayor did not have the sort of "direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest" that paralleled the situation in Tumey
and that the village's reliance on the income generated by the mayor's
court did "not mean that a mayor's impartiality is so diminished
thereby that he cannot act in a disinterested fashion in a judicial
capacity."305
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court was not so trusting of the
mayor's ability to maintain his detachment and impartiality under
these circumstances. First, the Court declared that "[t]he fact that the
mayor [in Tumey] . . . shared directly in the fees and costs did not

define the limits of the principle" regarding the relationship between
impartiality and the guarantee of due process of law. 306 Second, the
Court reasserted the test that had been used in Tumey: "whether the
Id. at 271 ("And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.").
409 U.S. 57 (1972).
299
Id. at 59-60.

297

298

300 Id.
301

Id. at 58.

302

id.
303 See id.

Id. at 59.
Id.
306
Id. at 60.
0
305
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mayor's situation is one 'which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the 307
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused."'
Third, the Court applied this test and found that based on the
circumstances presented:
Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for
village finances may make him partisan to maintain
the high level of contribution from the mayor's
court. This, too, is a "situation in which an official
perforce occupies two practically and seriously
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other
judicial, (and) necessarily involves a lack of due
process of law in the trial of defendants charged
with crimes before him." 30 8
The Court also rejected the adequacy of the two procedural
safeguards that the village proffered. The first was an Ohio statutory
provision that permitted the disqualification of interested, biased, or
prejudiced judges in particular cases. 309 The petitioner had apparently
failed to object under this provision. 3 10 The Court brushed aside this
statute for a variety of reasons. Most significantly, the Court objected
to the requirement that the petitioner present evidence overcoming a
presumption ofjudicial impartiality: "Ifthis means that an accused
must show special prejudice in his particular case, the statute requires
too much and protects too little."31' The village also noted that an
unfair procedure in the mayor's court could be corrected on appeal to
the County Court of Common Pleas, where the standard of review
was de novo. 312 An apparently outraged Supreme Court objected to
the suggestion that due process could be met by eventual justice:

307 Id. (quoting

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)) (emphasis added).
.os Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534) (emphasis added).
309
Id. at 6 1.
310

Id.
Id.

311
3 12 Id.
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"Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed
constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers
a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner 3is13 entitled to a
neutral and detached judge in the first instance."
Dissenting Justice White, who had been Deputy Attorney General
at the U.S. Department of Justice before joining the Supreme Court,
certainly understood that Tumey was being extended beyond the
simple principle that an official may not serve as the judge in a case
in which he has a direct financial stake in the outcome. 314 He also
understood that in Ward a majority of the Court refused to presume
the impartiality of an official who was a public, yet still embedded,
neutral. 1 s Justice White wrote:
To justify striking down the Ohio system on
its face, the Court must assume either that every
mayor-judge in every case will disregard his oath
and administer justice contrary to constitutional
commands or that this will happen often enough to
warrant the prophylactic, per se rule urged by
petitioner. I can make neither assumption with
respect to Ohio mayors nor with respect to similar
officials in 16 other States. Hence, I would leave the
due process matter to be decided on a case-by-case
basis ...

316

In Ward, a majority of the Justices were uncomfortable with the
Ohio statute in that it invited biased decision-making by city officials
struggling to fill local coffers and please their constituents. The
structural procedure provided by the statute and the fiscal pressures
of the city officials created an unconstitutional probability of bias.
Justice White, who indicated more trust in the integrity and the
ability of these officials to withstand temptation, would have required
an objection and proof that the officials were accepting the structural
invitation.

Id. at 61-62.
314 Id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting).
31
5Id.
313

316

Id.
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These cases - Tumey, Dugan, and Ward - are all generally

consistent with Caperton's emphasis upon the need for adjudicators to
avoid circumstances that will tempt them to issue biased decisions.
What is striking, however, is the degree to which the Supreme Court
in these cases went out of its way to: (1) preempt what it viewed as
illegitimate proceedings rather than require the complaining citizen to
prove that he had suffered from a decision tainted by actual bias, (2)
avoid establishing a presumption of impartiality for these neutrals,
and (3) refuse to require extreme circumstances in order to find an
unconstitutional probability of bias. Instead, the Court was quite
ready to be proactive in asserting a constitutional obstacle to "garden
variety" temptation of individual administrative adjudicators, perhaps
in order to "nip in the bud" the potential for extraordinary temptation.
B. The Temptation of an EntireAdministrative-AdjudicativeBody
Not to Hold the Balance Nice, Clear,and True
As the administrative state continued to grow, the Supreme
Court confronted the potential for structural bias in the design of an
entire administrative-adjudicative body. Probably due to the
consequences of finding an entire body's decision-making to be
unconstitutional, these cases present a more nuanced and complex
picture regarding the Court's willingness to be assertive in assuring
sufficient impartiality in administrative adjudication.
Gibson v. Berryhill,317 decided by the Supreme Court in 1973 on
the heels of Ward, seems to represent the high water mark in required
impartiality from embedded neutrals. There, the Supreme Court
examined the impartiality of an entire state board. The factual details
here - like the details in Caperton - are important because these

details seem to have played a significant role in the Court's ultimate
decision.
At the center of this action was a group of optometrists who
practiced as employees of a company - Lee Optical - rather than as

independent optometrists. 3 18 These optometrist-employees faced
potential revocation of their licenses by the Alabama Board of

317
318

411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Id. at 567.
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Optometry. 319 The Alabama Optometric Association, whose
membership was limited to independent practitioners of optometry,
had filed charges against Lee Optical's optometrist-employees
following the repeal and amendment of a relevant state statute. 320 The
Association apparently had urged that the amendment of the statute
(which removed reference to commercial stores' operation of optical
departments) made it illegal to practice optometry as an employee of
a business corporation and also argued that such employment
violated the Association's professional ethics rules. 32 1
Just two days after the Association filed its charges with the
Alabama Board of Optometry, the Board brought its own action in
state court against Lee Optical and thirteen of its optometristemployees.3 2 2 According to Justice White, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Supreme Court, the conduct cited by the Board as the
basis for its claims against the optometrists was "very similar to that
charged by the Association in its complaint to the Board." 323 The
state court dismissed the Board's claims against the individual
optometrist-employees, but enjoined Lee Optical from practicing
optometry and employing licensed optometrists. 324 The optometristemployees would no longer have jobs. The company appealed.
By the time these events had elapsed, nearly six years had passed
since the Association had filed its original charges before the Board.
While the state action proceeded at the trial court level, the Board
suspended its own proceedings against the optometrist-employees. 325
But after winning injunctive relief against Lee Optical in state court,
the Board "reactivated" those proceedings and scheduled a series of
hearings. 326 The optometrist-employees now countered with their
319

1d. at 568.
320 This statute had formerly been understood to permit the existence of
commercial stores with optical departments under the direction of optometristemployees. See id. at 565-66.
321
Id. at 568.
322 The Board sought to enjoin Lee Optical from engaging in the unlawfiul
practice of optometry and claimed that the optometrist-employees were aiding and
abetting the company in its illegal activities. See id. at 568-69.
323 Id.

324
325

Id. at 569.
Id.

326 Id.
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own action in federal court, seeking an injunction against the
hearings. 327 They claimed that because membership of the Board was
statutorily limited to members of the Alabama Optometric
Association - whose membership was limited to independent
optometrists - "the Board was biased and could not provide the
plaintiffs with a fair and impartial hearing in conformity with due
process of law." 328 The federal district court agreed with the
optometrist-employees and enjoined the Board's hearings. 3 29 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Similar to the defendant village in Ward, the Board had
apparently argued that the optometrist-employees should be required
to participate in the hearings before they could object to them as
unconstitutional. 330 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that if the
Board was "incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the issues
pending before it,"331 then the Court was "also correct that it need not
defer to the Board."3 32 Also similar to the defendant village in Ward,
the Board had apparently argued that the optometrist-employees'
federal action was not ripe because any potential deficiency in the
Board's proceedings would be cured by de novo judicial review by a
state court.3 33 The Supreme Court also rejected that argument, but for
unclear reasons. 334 The federal district court had concluded "that to
require the Plaintiffs to resort to the protection offered by state law in
these cases would effectively deprive them of their property, that is,
their right to practice their professions, without due process of law

327Id.

328

Id. at 570.

329
33 0

Id.

331

d. at 574-75.
Id. at 577.

332 Id.
333

Id.
Id. ("Nor, in these circumstances, would a different result be required
simply because judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the
conclusion of the administrative proceedings."). In footnote 16, Justice White
observed that the district court had found that the revocation of the employeeoptometrists' licenses along with the inevitable attendant publicity would result in
irreparable damage to the appellees for which no adequate remedy would be
afforded by state law. Id. at 577 n.16.
334
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and that irreparable injury would follow in the normal course of
events." 335
In the majority opinion, Justice White carefully summarized the
reasoning of the district court, which had applied the test established
in Ward to the particular factual circumstances before it in order to
find the Board's proceedings unconstitutional:
For the District Court, the inquiry was not whether
the Board members were "actually biased but
whether, in the natural course of events, there is an
indication of a possible temptation to an average
man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or
against any issue presented to him' .... Such a
possibility of bias was found to arise in the present
case from a number of factors. First, was the fact
that the Board, which acts as both prosecutor and
judge in delicensing proceedings, had previously
brought suit against the plaintiffs on virtually
identical charges in the state courts. This the
District Court took to indicate that members of the
Board might have "preconceived opinions" with
regard to the cases pending before them. Second,
the court found as a fact that Lee Optical Co. did a
large business in Alabama, and that if it were forced
to suspend operations the individual members of the
Board, along with other private practitioners of
optometry, would fall heir to this business. Thus, a
serious question of a personal financial stake in the
matter in controversy was raised. Finally, the
District Court appeared to regard the Board as a
suspect adjudicative body in the cases then pending
before it, because only members of the Alabama
Optometric Association could be members of the
Board, and because the Association excluded from
membership optometrists such as the plaintiffs who
were employed by other persons or entities. The

335

Id. at 571-72 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F.Supp. 122, 126 (M.D.
Ala. 1971)).
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result was that 92 of the 192 practicing optometrists
in Alabama were denied participation in the
governance of their own profession. 336
The Supreme Court showed deference to the federal district court
while explicitly sidestepping the opportunity here to address the per
se constitutionality of administrative agencies' combination of
investigative and adjudicatory functions. Instead, the Court noted the
split within the federal courts on this issue and deferred its
disposition of that issue until another day.337 Specifically, the Court
affirmed the federal district court's finding of unconstitutionality
based on the second and third of the three factors identified by the
district court above. Interestingly, Justice White combined these
factors into one - the "ground of possible personal interest" 338 - by
observing that optometrists-employees "accounted for nearly half of
all the optometrists practicing in Alabama" 339 while "the Board of
Optometry was composed solely of optometrists in private practice
for their own account."3 4 0 As a result:
[T]he Board's efforts [which would result in
revocation of the licenses of all optometristemployees, not just those employed by Lee Optical]
would possibly redound to the personal benefit of
members of the Board, sufficiently so that in the
opinion of the District Court, the Board was
constitutionally disqualified from hearing the
charges filed against the appellees. 34 1
Justice White then cited Tumey and Ward for the principle that
"those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should
not adjudicate those disputes"3 4 2 and added that Ward "indicates that
336

Id. at 571 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. at 125) (citation
omitted).
3
37 Id. 579-80.
138 Id. at 579.
139 Id. at 578.
340 Id.

341 Id.
342

Id. at 579.
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the financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to
be in Tumey."3 43 Ultimately, Justice White and a majority of the
Supreme Court stood ready to defer to the district court's conclusion:
[T]he pecuniary interest of the members of the
Board of Optometry had sufficient substance to
disqualify them, given the context in which this
case arose. As remote as we arefrom the local
realities underlying this case and it being very likely
that the DistrictCourthas a firmer grasp of the
facts and of their significance to the issues
presented, we have no good reason on this recordto
overturn its conclusion and we affirm it.3 M
Although Justice White was not ready to assume the bad faith of
state administrators based on the mere appearance of partiality, he
was apparently persuaded by the evidence gathered and presented
that the average independent optometrist on the Board of Optometry
would be unconstitutionally tempted not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true when confronting the extent of the financial spoils
available in Alabama.
There are certainly parallels among the Board of Optometry in
Gibson, the mayoral office in Ward, and NAF. Each had a direct
pecuniary interest in adjudicating the dispute(s) at hand. But unlike
the situations presented in Ward and Gibson, NAF had a somewhat
less direct interest in the outcome of particular cases and shielded its
individual arbitrators from knowledge of the extent of its likely
financial interest in arbitral outcomes that were favorable to the
repeat players. Perhaps NAF did this for altruistic reasons, to protect
the integrity of its arbitration services. Or perhaps NAF did this
because it did not want its arbitrators to compare the income they

343

Id.

3" Id. (emphasis added); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204-06
(1985) (holding that members of committee that presided over prison disciplinary
proceedings were entitled to qualified immunity only because the committee was
composed of members of the prison staff rather than "professional hearing officers"
who were "truly independent" and the hearings "contained few of the procedural
safeguards" that characterized administrative hearings in Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978)).
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earned in conducting hearings and issuing awards to the income
earned by NAF's principals in creating, managing, and promoting
their arbitrators' services. The truth likely lies somewhere in between,
and it is not clear that NAFs intent matters at all to our legal analysis.
However, with Arnett v. Kennedy,34 5 the Supreme Court's
assertive protection of the impartiality of administrative adjudicative
bodies began to change. The Court began to express more explicit
deference to such bodies and presume their impartiality until
evidence proved that such a presumption was not deserved. In this
case, a nonprobationary federal employee, Wayne Kennedy, brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that he had
been denied the right to free speech and due process when he was
discharged from the Chicago Regional Office of the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO).34 6 Wendell Verduin, the Regional
Director of the OEO, presented Kennedy with a "Notification of
Proposed Adverse Action" and listed five charges, including one that
Kennedy had publicly accused Verduin and his administrative
assistant of attempting to bribe a representative of a community
action organization with an offer of a $100,000 grant of OEO funds if
the representative would sign a statement against Kennedy and
another OEO employee.3 4 7 Kennedy asserted his "right to a trial-type
hearing before an impartial hearing officer before he could be
removed from his employment.. .. 348 Verduin notified Kennedy in
writing of his removal. Kennedy appealed directly to the Civil
Service Commission and brought suit in federal district court. 34 9 A
three-judge panel granted Kennedy summary judgment, finding that
the discharge procedure authorized by the Lloyd-La Follette Act for
the removal of non-probationary federal employees and
accompanying Civil Service Commission and OEO regulations
denied Kennedy due process of law for the failure to provide "for the
decision on removal or suspension to be made by an impartial agency
34

1416

U.S. 134 (1974).

346

Id. at 136-37.
347
Id. at 137.
348 Id. Kennedy

also took advantage of his right under regulations promulgated
by the Civil Service Commission to reply to the charges, but did not respond to
their substance except to note that his conversations had been "inaccurately set
forth in the adverse action." Id. at 138 n.2.
349
Id. at 138.
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official, or for Kennedy (by his own means) to present witnesses; or
for his right to confront adverse witnesses." 350
A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Kennedy's due
process rights had not been violated, but there was no majority for
the reasoning underlying that judgment.3 5' Justice Rehnquist, joined
by the Chief Justice and only one other justice, found that though
Congress had chosen to provide federal employees with substantive
right of job security under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress had
also chosen in the same Act (even the same sentence) to limit the
procedural protections afforded to enforce the right. 352 "[W]e decline
to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart
from the procedure provided for its enforcement," 35 3 he added,
"where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in
determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take
the bitter with the sweet." 354 According to these three Justices,
Kennedy's employer was not required to provide any adjudicator
other than Verduin or any process other than the one provided.3 55
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred but found
that Kennedy did have a property interest in continued employment
absent "cause" and was therefore entitled to due process under the
Constitution.35 6 However, he also found - based on an assessment of
the private interest affected by the deprivation and the Government's
interest in summary removal - that a post-removal evidentiary
hearing available to Kennedy represented a reasonable
accommodation and met the due process requirement of an impartial
3

s0 Id. at 176-77. The Civil Service Commission regulations provided, among
other things, that an employee "shall have an opportunity to appear before the
official vested with authority to make the removal decision in order to answer the
charges against him" and the right to appeal which will involve an evidentiary trialtype hearing. "[I]f the employee is reinstated on appeal, he receives full back pay,
less any amounts earned by him through other employment during that period." Id.
at 143-46.
3
Id. at 163.
352
Id. at 152.
353 Id.
3
Id. at 153-54.
355
Id. at 163.
356
Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
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decisionmaker. 357 He found no requirement of an impartial
decisionmaker at the pre-removal stage, based either on the relevant
statutes or the Constitution. 358
Justice White, who had counseled for the presumption of respect
for administrative decisionmakers in the past, concurred in part and
dissented in part.359 Like Justices Powell and Blackmun, he disagreed
with Justice Rehnquist's assertion that Congress could condition the
grant of a substantive right upon the acceptance of otherwiseunconstitutional procedural limitations. 360 Rather, "[w]hile the State
may define what is and what is not property, once having defined
those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I understand
it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental
proposition." 36 1 Justice White went on to find, however, that the
relevant statutory and regulatory requirements of thirty days advance
notice and the right to make written presentation satisfied the
minimal requirements of the Due Process Clause. Then he turned to
the demand for an impartial decisionmaker. Very interestingly, he
found an unconstitutionally high risk of partiality in this case:
Fairness and accuracy are not always threatened
simply because the hearing examiner is the
supervisor of the employee, or, as in this case, the
Regional Director over many employees, including
appellee. But here the hearing official was the
object of slander that was the basis for the
employee's proposed discharge..

.

. In ruling that

the employee was to be terminated, the hearing
examiner's own reputation, as well as the efficiency
of the service, was at stake; and although Mr.
Verduin may have succeeded, in fact, in
disassociating his own personal feelings from his
decision as to the interests of OEO, the risk and the
357

Id. at 170-71.

358 Id. at 170 n.5 ("In my view the relevant fact is that an impartial

decisionmaker is provided at the post-removal hearing where the employee's
claims are finally resolved.").
359
Id.at 171 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
360
Id. at 177.
361 Id. at 185.
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appearance that this was not the case were too great
to tolerate. In such situations the official normally
charged with the discharge decision need only
recuse and transfer the file to a person qualified to
make the initial decision. We need not hold that the
Lloyd-La Follette Act is unconstitutional for its lack
of provision for an impartial hearing examiner.
Congress is silent on the matter. We would rather
assume, because of the constitutionalproblems in
not so providing, that, iffaced with the question (at
least on the facts of this case) Congress would have

so provided.3 62
Ultimately, Justice White stated that he would order
reinstatement and back pay, due to the failure to provide an impartial
hearing officer at the pre-termination hearing. 363
Justice Marshall dissented and was joined by Justices Douglas
and Brennan.3 64 After a thorough review of the procedural due
process jurisprudence, the dissenters noted that a majority of the
Court rejected Rehnquist's argument that Kennedy's statutory
entitlement could be conditioned on a statutory limitation of
procedural due process protections. 365 Justice Marshall found that
removal from employment represented a very significant deprivation
and thus, Kennedy should have received the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, etc. 366 He added:
It also seems clear that for the hearing to be
meaningful, the hearing officer must be independent
and unbiased and his decision be entitled to some
weight. We addressed the importance of this
element of due process in Goldberg. . . where we
found the requirements of due process were not met
by the review of a welfare termination decision by a

362
363

3

Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
Id. at 202.
Id. at 206. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

365 Id. at 211.
366

Id. at 226-27.
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caseworker who was, in effect, also the
complainant.... The need for an independent
decisionmaker is particularly crucial in the public
employment context, where the reason for the
challenged dismissal may well be related to some
personal antagonism between the employee and his
superior, as appears to be the case here. 3 67
The dissent then focused on the timing of a full evidentiary hearing
before an impartial decisionmaker - which was the central issue
before the court. Later, however, Justice Marshall returned to the
need for an impartial decisionmaker:
The Regional Director assembled the evidence
against appellee, proposed the dismissal, then
decided it should be effected; he acted as
complaining witness, prosecutor, and judge. The
meaningless bureaucratic paper shuffling afforded
appellee before his discharge would surely not
alone satisfy the stringent demands of due process
when such an important interest is at stake. The
decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that a
worker with a claim of entitlement to public
employment absent specified cause has a property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause and
therefore the right to an evidentiary hearing before
an impartial decisionmaker prior to dismissal.3 6 8
For our purposes, it is important to remember that a majority
concluded that Kennedy's employer had not violated his due process
rights. It is also important to note that only four Justices expressed
concern regarding Verduin's likely bias, and that these concerns
required careful consideration of the facts and human dynamics
involved in the situation. On the other hand, it is quite interesting that
Justice White, a former federal administrator, was one of the four
Justices who had serious concerns about impartiality.

367
68

Id. at 216.
Id. at 226-27.
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Justice White had the opportunity to return to a defense of the
integrity and authority of state-appointed decisionmakers two years
later in Withrow v. Larkin,369 which explicitly established a strong
"presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators."3 70 This case is reminiscent of Gibson because it
involves another citizen claiming violation of his right to due process
as a result of adjudication by an administrative tribunal that he
perceived as biased. The disposition and resulting rule, however, are
strikingly different. In Withrow, a physician faced suspension of his
license by the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, a body
composed of practicing Wisconsin physicians.37 ' The Board had
conducted an investigation of the physician and determined that there
was probable cause that he had violated criminal provisions and
should have his license revoked.37 2 This physician's entire practice in
Wisconsin consisted of performing abortions at his office in
Milwaukee. 37 3 The same Board then planned to hold a contested
hearing in order to determine whether to suspend the physician's
license. 3 74 After a series of legal proceedings, a three-member federal
district court issued an order for preliminary injunctive relief that
prevented the Board from proceeding with its proposed contested
hearing. 375 The district court explained:
[F]or the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Larkin's
license at its own contested hearing on charges
evolving from its own investigation would
constitute denial to him of his rights to procedural
due process. Insofar as [the Wisconsin statute]
authorizes a procedure wherein a physician stands
to lose his liberty or property, absent the
intervention of an independent, neutral and

369

421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).

370

Id.

371

Id. at 38-39.

372

Id. at 39.
Id. at 38-39.
374
Id. at 39.
3 73

375 Id at 41.

576

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

30-2

detached decision maker, we concluded that it was
unconstitutional and unenforceable. 376
The district court later limited its decision to enjoin enforcement
of the statute against the physician in this case.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice White,
disagreed with the district court's assessment that the physician had a
high probability of success on his constitutional claim. Justice White
dutifully cited to Tumey, Ward, and In re Murchison and admitted
that "various situations have been identified in which experience
teaches that the probabilityof actual bias on the part of thejudge or
decisionmakeris too high to be constitutionallytolerable."3 77 But
Justice White then limited these situations to ones "in which the
adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he
has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party
before him."378 Justice White distinguished those situations from the
case before the Court, which involved only the combination of two
different governmental functions, investigation and adjudication, and
a strongly held difference of opinion on moral issues. For a case such
as this one, Justice White established a strong presumption in favor
of the fitness of those serving as adjudicators - which would require
substantial evidence for any complainant to overcome:
The contention that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily
creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in
administrative adjudication has a much more
difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same
individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if

36
1 Id.

at 46.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
378 Id.
3n
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the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.3 7 9
The Court's reference to "psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses" may have signaled openness to considering social
psychological evidence regarding the self-serving bias,3 80 but other
language in the opinion underscored the heavy burden faced by
anyone attempting to overcome the presumption favoring
adjudicators - provided that their alleged bias was based on
something other than pecuniary interest in the outcome or personal
antagonism between the decisionmaker and the person asserting a
violation of due process.
For example, Justice White cited to the Supreme Court's decision
in FTC v. Cement Institute,"' involving allegations of bias in an
adjudicatory proceeding by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The same Commission had previously conducted an investigation
regarding a pricing system used by the cement industry, and certain
Commission members had testified before Congress that they viewed
the pricing system as illegal. In contrast to the investigation, the
FTC's adjudicatory proceeding directly and fully involved members
379 Id.
3s0 See Gregory N. Mandel, Technology Wars: The FailureofDemocratic
Discourse,11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117, 164 (2005) ("A wealth of

empirical data reveal that people have irrationally high confidence in their
judgments.... Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or experimental
situations. Various studies have found that experts often exhibit an overconfidence
bias, and studies of real world, professional predictions routinely confirm
overconfidence as well."); see also Keith Allred, RelationshipDynamics in
Disputes: Replacing Contention with Cooperation,in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 84 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (describing
several biases-naive realism, confirmatory bias, accuser and excuser biases, and
lone moderate effect-that "lead us to exaggerate other people's hostility and
unreasonableness [and] trigger cycles of suspicion and conflict escalation"); Rafeal
Efrat, Attribution Theory Bias and the PerceptionofAbuse in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 205, 217 (2003) ("As a result of
the failure to follow the objective paradigm envisioned in the attribution theory, a
person's perception of the cause of another's behavior becomes vulnerable to a
number of biases, thus becoming less accurate."); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the
Light: Information Overloadand Its Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 457 (2003) ("[S]tudies show that people who are very
successful tend to be especially confident in their abilities.").
18' 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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of the cement industry who were permitted to present evidence and
conduct cross-examination. Justice White approvingly quoted the
following language from the Supreme Court's opinion in FTC v.
Cement Institute: "[T]he fact that the Commission had entertained
such views [that the pricing system at issue was illegal] as the result
of its prior ex ante investigations did not necessarily mean that the
minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the
respondents' basing point practices." 382 Later in the Withrow opinion,
Justice White asserts:
No specific foundation has been presented for
suspecting that the Board had been prejudiced by its
investigation or would be disabled from hearing and
deciding on the basis of the evidence to be
presented at the contested hearing. The mere
exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary
investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to
impugn the fairness of the board members at a later
[and presumable sufficient] adversary hearing.
Without a showing to the contrary, state
administrators "are assumed to be men of
conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of
judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis
of its own circumstances."38 3
Note the contrast between the tests used by the Court in judging
the impartiality - and integrity - of the Ohio mayors compared to the

tests used for the members of this Wisconsin board. In Tumey and
Ward, the Court considered whether the average (and presumably
flawed) man would be able to hold the balance "nice, clear and true."
On the other hand, in Withrow, the Court envisioned "men of
conscience and intellectualdiscipline" and required evidence that the
adjudicators' minds were "irrevocably closed." 384 The mayors were
assumed incapable of detaching themselves sufficiently from their
own financial interests, and the financial interests of their
382

Id. at 701 (emphasis added).

383 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,

421 (1941)) (emphasis added).
3
Id. at 48, 55.
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constituents and neighbors, to provide a fair procedure to an outsider.
The members of the board were granted much greater deference,
even though they also were dealing with an outsider. Why this
dramatic difference in the trust and deference to these administrative
adjudicators? The answers are probably several, some embedded in
the words of the opinions and others found in the historical and
cultural context of the time.
First, the Court seemed to perceive very different potential
influences upon these men. In Tumey and Ward, the Court was
dealing with the powerful and illegitimate influence of money - and
men who had allowed themselves to be put in this situation. In
contrast, in Withrow, money - or access to this doctor's patients - did
not seem to be the - or even a - motivating factor. Instead, the

members of the board were behaving in a manner consistent with
their own local morals and principles.
Second and relatedly, the Court seemed to imagine very different
sorts of outsiders encountering difficulties with the local
decisionmakers. In Tumey and Ward, we find the innocent, hapless
outsider who is exploited inappropriately by local officials. In
Gibson, the innocent outsider may be Lee Optical, a corporation just
trying to serve a market in a different and perhaps less expensive
manner, or Lee Optical's optometrist-employees encountering
professional discrimination based only on their decision to ply their
trade as employees rather than solo practitioners. Withrow offered a
dramatic contrast. Here, the outsider was flouting a local profession's
culture and strongly held personal values. Under this reading, the
members of the board were not exploiting or inappropriately
discriminating against anyone. They were defending their state from
an incursion that they viewed as harmful and immoral.
Third, there are institutional considerations. In Withrow, Justice
White noted that if the courts are to be permitted to function with
some level of efficiency, judges themselves could not fully live up to
the absolutist expectations expressed in Tumey and Ward. Again
quoting from FTC v. Cement Institute, Justice White wrote:
"No decision of this Court would require us
to hold that it would be a violation of procedural
due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had
expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of
conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges
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frequently try the same case more than once and
decide identical issues each time, although these
issues involve questions both of law and fact.
Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot
possibly be under stronger constitutional
compulsions in this respect than a court."3 85
Justice White listed several additional examples of interim
decision-making by judges that did not disqualify judges from
presiding over subsequent proceedings.3 86 For example, judges retry
cases that have been reversed or remanded; judges issue arrest
warrants and then may preside over the subsequent criminal trials;
judges may issue or deny temporary restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions and then preside over the subsequent injunction
proceedings; judges rule on motions to dismiss or summary judgment
motions and then may preside over subsequent civil trials. If judges
can be trusted to change their minds in response to the full
presentation of evidence, then why not extend this trust to
administrative adjudicators?" "We find no warrant for imposing upon
administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby [administrative
hearing] examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled
strongly against a party in the first hearing."'38 7 Reaching a
preliminary decision and acting upon it does not imply an inability to
listen to a fuller explication of the case in the future - assuming, of
course, that such fuller explication occurs.
Indeed, the Court expressed faith in the existence of the "rational
man," who will be painfully aware that his prior opinion is not fully
informed and thus will invite all parties to present, will listen
carefully to the evidence they present, and will intentionally permit
himself to be persuaded to a contrary result if such a result is justified
by the evidence. The rational man, provided that he is neither
psychologically nor economically committed to a particular outcome,
is ready, willing, and able to change his mind. Though the Court
never specifically referenced the "rational man," the opinion
consistently returns to the psychological question of whether this
38 5

Id. at 48-49 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702-03 (1948)).
Id. at 56-57.
38 7
Id. at 49 (quoting NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236-37
38 6

(1947)).
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"rational man" characterizes administrative adjudicative bodies. 388 In
the absence of concrete evidence that he does not exist - and thus, in
the absence of the influence of money or personal attacks, which are
known to be particularly potent to every man, regardless of his
rationality - the Court presumes the rational man's viability:
The risk of bias or prejudgment in this
sequence of functions [investigation, followed by a
finding of probable cause, followed by a full and
contested hearing] has not been considered to be
intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great
possibility that the adjudicators would be so
psychologically wedded to their complaints that
they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the
appearance of having erred or changed position.
Indeed, just as there is no logical inconsistency
between a finding of probable cause and an
acquittal in a criminal proceeding, there is no
incompatibility between the agency filing a
complaint based on probable cause and a
subsequent decision, when all the evidence is in,
that there has been no violation of the statute. Here,
if the Board now proceeded after an adversary
hearing to determine that appellee's license to
practice should not be temporarily suspended, it
would not implicitly be admitting error in its prior
finding of probable cause. Its position most
probably would merely reflect the benefit of a more
complete view of the evidence afforded by an
adversary hearing.3 89
In a nod to Gibson, the Court also noted:
That the combination of investigative and
adjudicative functions does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation, does not, of

388

389

See id
Id at 57-58.
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course,preclude a courtfrom determiningfrom the
specialfacts and circumstancespresent in the case
before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably
high. Findings of that kind made by judges with
special insights into local realitiesare entitled to
respect, but injunctions resting on such factors
should be accompaniedby at least the minimum
390
findings required by Rules 52(a) and 65(d).
In Withrow, unlike Ward or Gibson, the allegation of
prejudgment was separated from an allegation of direct or indirect
pecuniary interest or of personal antagonism. Prejudgment alone,
without a more compelling personal (or temporal) stake, was not a
sufficient basis for a finding of unconstitutionality. And according to
Tumey, Ward, and Gibson, pecuniary interest had to be concrete and
relatively substantial - even if it was indirect - in order to warrant a

finding of unconstitutionality.
Finally and perhaps most important, in Withrow, the Court
references the structural and administrative complexities presented
by a growing welfare state. In Richardson v. Perales,3 9 1 the Court
had upheld a system in which the same Social Security examiner
conducted fact-finding and then made decisions regarding disability
claims. Justice White wrote: "[T]he challenge to this combination of
functions 'assumes too much and would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure
of great and growing complexity."'3 92 Later, he stated that "our cases,
although they reflect the substance of the problem [the combination
of investigative and adjudicatory functions], offer no support for the
bald proposition applied in this case by the District Court that agency
members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from
adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in
this country will not yield to any single organizing principle." 393 That
last statement is incredibly frank. The administrative state and its
procedures had become too ubiquitous to permit them to fail. At the

390 Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
3

402 U.S. 389 (1971).

392

Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49-50 (quoting Richardson,402 U.S. at 410).
Id. at 52.

393

Fail 2010

What is "(Im)partial Enough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals

583

same time, these administrative procedures presented problems for a
country that was supposed to be governed by the rule of law, not
men.
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge,39 4 decided in 1976, underscored
the Supreme Court's increasingly instrumental view of procedure.
Though Goldberg v. Kelly was not explicitly overruled, its reach was
severely curtailed. Mathews established the three-part balancing test
that we use today to determine whether the procedure that has been
used to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property violates
constitutional due process.3 9 5 The three factors to be considered are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.3 9 6
Obviously, this test explicitly recognized agencies' administrative
and fiscal concerns as a legitimate counterbalance to procedural
purity and required the plaintiff to demonstrate both sufficiently
grievous harm and the likelihood of erroneous deprivation. As was
true with Goldberg, Mathews did not explicitly deal with the issue of
the impartiality of the decisionmaker, though the underlying facts
suggest that the decisionmakers there had made up their minds. 397 On
the other hand, there was no evidence of personal pecuniary interest
influencing the outcome. Ultimately, the Court found no violation of
due process.
This series of cases is different from the first series discussed
above because the real defendants here are the agencies or decision394
395

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.

396

Id.
3 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue Process Calculusfor
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofA
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 29 (1976).
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making tribunals as a whole, not merely an individual adjudicator.
The Court appears to tread much more carefully in these cases, likely
because finding a constitutional violation could wreak havoc upon
the entire administrative infrastructure. On the other hand, the Court
continues to find unconstitutionality if the claim of bias is based on
substantiatedallegations of inappropriate pecuniary interest or strong
personal antagonism.
C. The Temptation of Case-DependentContractorsNot to
Hold the Balance Nice, Clear and True
Schweiker v. McClure3 98 is the last case that this Article will
examine in connection with the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence arising out of allegations of partiality or bias. This case
is particularly interesting because it involves an agency's delegation
of certain functions to private insurance carriers which then
outsourced the adjudicative function to individual hearing officers,
much as the credit-card companies outsourced arbitration to NAF
which then contracted with individual arbitrators.
In Schweiker, the agency involved was the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. 399 The Department administered the
Medicare program, which consisted of two parts: Part A, which
provided publicly-financed health insurance to all older or disabled
Americans regardless of their financial need, and Part B, which
existed to provide the "supplemental" benefits not provided by Part
A. 400 Participation in Part B was limited to those individuals who
chose voluntarily to enroll and to pay monthly premiums, but the
U.S. Treasury also contributed to Part B. 4 01' The Court described Part
B as "consequently resembling a private medical insurance program
39 456 U.S. 188 (1982); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 653 (1990) (noting that Due Process Clause had not been specifically
invoked and that statute at issue did not specifically require the procedural
protections asserted by LTV); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980)
(stating that civil penalty system and return of fines assessed by administrative law
judge to federal agency did not violate due process because it was "the
administrative law judge, not the [Employment Standards Administration], who
performs the function of adjudicating child labor violations").
3
" Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 189.
400 Id. at 189-90.
a'Id.at 190.
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that is subsidized in major part by the Federal Government." 402
Twenty seven million individuals participated in Part B at the time
that Schweiker was decided; 158 million claims had been processed
in 1980; and on an annual basis, the Department provided more than
$10 billion in benefits (in 1982 dollars). 4 03
In 1965, Congress had authorized the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to outsource the
administration of this mammoth program.4 04 According to the
portions of the legislative record cited by the Court, Congress had
done this in order to "make the administration of this sweeping
program more efficient" 405 and "to take advantage of . . . insurance
carriers' 'great experience in reimbursing physicians."' 4 06 For
California, the Secretary of Health and Human Services had selected
Blue Shield of California and the Occidental Insurance Co. to process
claims. 407 The carriers were not named parties, though the Supreme
Court described them as agents of the agency.4 08 Presumably, these
carriers were paid for the services they performed on behalf of the
agency, but these financial arrangements were not described in the
Court's opinion.
The Court was careful to point out that when Blue Shield or
Occidental determined whether to pay claims made under Part B, the
carrier followed a "precisely specified process"40 9 and paid the claim
"out of the Government's Trust Fund - not out of its own pocket." 4 10
Not surprisingly, the carriers did not grant every claim for benefits.
They provided any unhappy claimant with de novo review, based on
written evidence, by a carrier employee other than the employee who
had made the initial decision. 4 1 1 If a claimant remained dissatisfied
after this initial review and had a claim worth at least $100, the
claimant could proceed to an oral hearing before a "hearing officer"
402
403

Id.
Id.

404 Id.
405

Id.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, pt. 1, at 46 (1965)).
407 Id.
406

408 Id.

409

Id. at 191.

410

Id.

411

Id.
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who had not previously participated in the case she was now
adjudicating.4 1 2 Importantly, the hearing officer's decision on Part B
claims was not subject to judicial review.4 1 3
Three claimants, whose appeals were not granted by the carriers'
hearing officers,4 14 brought a federal action against the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, claiming that the hearings violated their
constitutional rights.4 1 5 They were then certified as representatives of
a nationwide class. 4 16 The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.4 17 The federal district court granted the class' motion based
on the issues of partiality and unappealability and denied the
Secretary's motion on these issues, concluding that the "links
between the carriers and their hearing officers [were] sufficient to
create a constitutionally intolerable risk of hearing officer bias
against claimants."4 18 The district court relied on two alternative rules
of law: (1) that tribunals must be impartial in accordance with Tumey,
and (2) that the sufficiency of due process depended upon the threepart balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.4 19
The district court's decision appears to be grounded in the court's
conclusion that the "identity of interest" among the hearing officers,
insurance carriers, and Department was too strong. The carriers, of
course, were operating under contract with the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. The carriers involved in disputes with
claimants selected and appointed the hearing officers to particular
cases. The carriers largely trained the hearing officers. 420 The hearing

412 id.
4 13

See McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 418 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
One claimant was denied reimbursement for a sex change operation while
the second was denied partial reimbursement for the cost of an air ambulance
because he was taken to a specially equipped hospital rather than a hospital closer
to his home. The third claimant was denied reimbursement for an appendectomy
because the hearing officer reasoned that it was incidental to a cholecystectomy
which was done at the same time. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 192 n.2.
41 5
Id. at 192.
416 Id.
414

417
418

id.

d. at 193.
Id. at 192-93.
420
Id. at 193 n.4.
1

4 19
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officers relied upon the carriers for their case-dependent incomes.4 2 1
Most strikingly, the court found that "five out of seven of Blue
Shield's past and present hearing officers '[were] former or current
Blue Shield employees."'42 2 Pointing to other information in the
record and returning to Withrow's dual presumption of lack of bias by
the administrative adjudicator and the complainant's burden of
proving a "disqualifying interest," 42 3 the Supreme Court disagreed
with the district court's decision to grant summary judgment:
Fairly interpreted, the factual findings made in
this case do not reveal any disqualifying interest
under the standard of our cases. The District Court
relied almost exclusively on generalized
assumptions of possible interest, placing special
weight on the various connections of the hearing
officers with the private insurance carriers. The
difficulty with this reasoningis that these
connections would be relevant only if the carriers
themselves are biasedor interested. We find no
basis in the recordfor reachingsuch a conclusion.
As previously noted, the carriers pay all Part B
claims from federal, and not their own, funds.
Similarly, the salaries of the hearing officers are
paid by the Federal Government. Further, the
carriers operate under contracts that require
compliance with standards prescribed by the statute
and the Secretary. In the absence ofproof of
financialinterest on the part of the carriers,there is
no basisfor assuming a derivative bias among their
hearing officers.424
Buried in footnotes, the Court also rejected other evidence
proffered by the claimants. For example, the claimants had asserted
that the Secretary was "biased in favor of inadequate Part B awards"

421

Id. at 192.

422

Id at 193.

423
424

Id at 196.
Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
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based on the Department's assistance to carriers in "identify[ing]
medical providers who allegedly bill for more services than are
medically necessary" and its "warn[ing to] carriers to control
overutilization of medical services." 425 This echoes the mayor of
Monroeville who urged the chief of police to consider the village's
financial situation when deciding whether to charge someone under a
village ordinance or a state statute.4 26 There was no evidence that the
mayor asked the chief of police to charge someone unlawfully, only
that he consider the financial implication when deciding which
charge to impose. In Schweiker, however, the Court required more
than this to find bias:
This action by the Secretary is irrelevant. It simply
shows that he takes seriously his statutory duty to
ensure that only qualfying Part B claims are paid. .
. . It does not establish that the Secretary has sought
to discourage payment of Part B claims that do meet
Part B requirements. Such an effort would violate
Congress' direction. Absent evidence, it cannot be
presumed.4 2 7
The claimants also argued that "for reasons of psychology,
institutional loyalty, or carrier coercion, hearing officers would be
reluctant to differ with carrier determinations." 428 The Court rejected
this claim by noting a lack of solid evidence 429 and deferring to
congressional wisdom in permitting the delegation of public
functions to private parties: "Such assertions require substantiation
before they can provide a foundation for invalidating an Act of
Congress." 430 Finally, the Court tersely asserted without explanation
that "the fact that a hearing officer is or was a carrier employee does
not create a risk of partiality analogous to that possibly arising from
the professional relationship between a judge and a former partner or
425

Id. at 197 n.9.
See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
427 Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 197 n.9
428
Id. at 197 n.10.
429 It is unclear how much discovery had been done prior to the filing of the
summary judgment motions in this case.
430 Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 197 n. 10.
42 6
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associate." 43 1 It is a bit unclear why a judge would have more
difficulty resisting bias in an interaction with a former professional
colleague than would an employee in an interaction with her current
employer - or a contractor in an interaction with her current client knowing that the employer or client must operate within financial
constraints. Nonetheless, the Court added, "We simply have no
reason to doubt that hearing officers will do their best to obey the
Secretary's instruction manual" 432 including directives that "[t]he
parties' interests must be safeguarded to the full extent of their rights;
in like manner, the government's interest must be protected" ;433 and
"[t]he [hearing officer] must make independent and impartial
decisions ... and be objective and free of any influence which might
affect impartial judgment as to the facts, while being particularly
patient with older persons and those with physical and mental

impairments." 434
Perhaps this decision reflects the Court's belief in the detached
expertise of agencies and their delegates. One of the footnotes, for
example, cited to a portion of the Secretary of Human Services
Instruction Manual that stated: "[t]he hearing is non-adversary in
nature in that neither the carrier nor the Medicare Bureau is in
opposition to the party but is interested only in seeing that a proper

decision is made." 4 35
One final piece of evidence, though, was almost undoubtedly
central to the Court's analysis. The lower court acknowledged that the
Part B appellate process "frequently result[ed] in reversal of the
carriers' original dispositions 4 36 :
[Appellant] establish[es] that between 1975 and
1978, carriers wholly or partially reversed, upon
'review determination,' their initial determinations
in 51-57 percent of the cases considered. Of the
adverse determination decisions brought before

431

432

Id. at 197 n.11.

Id.
Id.
434
Id.
435 Id.
433

436

Id. at 194.
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hearing officers, 42-51 percent of the carriers'
decisions were reversed in whole or in part. 437
If the hearing officers ruled against the carriers (in whole or in
part) approximately half of the time, how could they be presumed to
be biased? The proof, the Court seemed to say, was in the pudding. 438
It is noteworthy that this case also involved application of the
three-part balancing test in Mathews. Apparently - and despite all of
the risk factors already identified - the lower court only cited to the
hearing examiners' potential lack of training and lack of threshold
criteria such as a law degree as the basis for finding a risk of
erroneous deprivation. 439 The Supreme Court scoffed at this analysis.
The lower court had not identified any "specific deficiencies in the
Secretary's selection criteria"; the evidence showed that the Secretary
required the carrier to use "qualified" individuals possessing "ability"
and "thorough knowledge."440 Last, the Court pointed to the
information in the record regarding education and experience of nine
of the hearing officers, concluding that "[t]heir qualifications tend to
undermine rather than to support the contention that accuracy of Part
B decision-making may suffer by reason of carrier appointment of
unqualified hearing officers."" 1 Once again invoking a "strong
presumption" - this time in favor of the validity of congressional
action and consistent with the Court's recognition of "congressional
solicitude for fair procedure"44 2 - the Court found that the required
showings of the second prong of the three-part balancing test had not
been met. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's granting of
the claimants' summary judgment motion. But the Court did even
more than that - it remanded for summary judgment to be entered in
favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.443
437

Id. at 194 n.6.
The importance of this factor supports California's institution of disclosure
requirements for arbitration organizations, including the requirement that
organizations indicate who won. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Transparency is an effective defense against the appearance of bias.
43 9
Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 194.
0
4" Id at 199.
4 Id. at 199-200.
442
Id. at 200 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)).
438

3

Id.
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Schweiker's ultimate disposition suggests the implausibility of
finding a Constitutional violation by NAF or its individual
arbitrators. Importantly, however, the many bases for distinguishing
Schweiker from Minnesota v. NAF suggest the potential application
of its reasoning - in combination with that of Caperton - to both

individual arbitrators and the institutionsresponsible for managing
today's embedded neutrals.
D. Reconsideringthe Application of the Supreme Court's
Jurisprudenceto NAFs Special Case
This exploration of the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence is especially interesting because it becomes clear that
the occurrence of partiality - or at least the appearance of partiality is not extraordinary at all when certain institutions have great power
unaccompanied by meaningful accountability mechanisms, and when
those institutions, in turn, give their members, employees or
contractors great power similarly unaccompanied by meaningful
accountability mechanisms. A wise soul once said, "Power corrupts,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 444 There is nothing new
here.
A complete review of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence also
reveals that quite "ordinary" or "garden variety" 445 circumstances the sort that likely occur every day in municipalities, federal and state
agencies, public schools, and workplaces throughout the nation have led the Supreme Court to deem some situations "constitutionally
[in]tolerable." This has been true particularly when the Court has
been persuaded by the evidence that has been gathered to show an
inappropriate pecuniary interest in ensuring a particular outcome even when the amount of money involved has been small or the
interest has been indirect. It seems that the Court has been more
easily persuaded by this evidence when judging the behavior of an

44 John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, known as Lord Acton. Letter from
Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 3, 1887).
44 Though this term is used as a synonym for "ordinary" here, so few people
have and tend their own gardens these days that the term may not longer be
appropriate. Indeed, just as trial has become the "alternative" dispute resolution
process in the U.S., perhaps "garden variety" ought to connote something special
and unique-like heirloom tomatoes.
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individualadjudicator, like the Ohio mayor-judges or even Judge
Benjamin in Caperton. Gibson, however, demonstrates that with
sufficient evidence, the Court may also be persuaded that an entire
adjudicative entity is not sufficiently impartial to meet the
requirements of due process. And despite its outcome, Schweiker
suggests the potential for a violation of due process when
adjudicative functions are delegated to private contractors.
Unlike Caperton, which began as a motion for recusal and thus
focused attention on an individual judge, Schweiker, Withrow,
Gibson, Kennedy, and other cases described herein also demonstrate
that institutions may need to bear responsibility for ensuring due
process - and bear the consequences if they fail to take any action
when they have reason to suspect that bias is infecting decisionmaking and dispute resolution by their members, employees, or
contractors.446 Schweiker is particularly interesting here - and
potentially useful - because it involves the use of contractors and
subcontractors, just like the "special case" of NAF. Though the
Supreme Court refused to find a violation of due process in
Schweiker, its analysis clearly demonstrates why the profit-oriented
cast of NAF's financial and corporate structure could - and perhaps
should - lead to a finding of such violation.
There are striking similarities between Schweiker and NAF and
its arbitrators. The powerful repeat player in Schweiker is Health and
Human Services; in NAF's case, it is the credit-card companies. The
insurance carriers likely solicited the opportunity to provide claims
processing and dispute resolution services for Health and Human
Services; NAF did the same with the credit-card companies. Health
and Human Services wanted to be sure that its funds were spent
appropriately; the credit-card companies likely were similarly
interested in protecting their fiscal resources. And the hearing
officers in Schweiker played a binding dispute resolution role and
supra note 38, at xiv (suggesting that in
implementing Due Process protocols, AAA has effectively promoted fair
procedures by refusing to administer arbitrations for over 600 companies, based on
their violations of the protocols); Christoper R. Drahozal, A BehavioralAnalysis of
PrivateJudging,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 105, 128
(noting that a study by Bingham and Shimon Sarraf compared outcomes before and
after an Employment Due Process Protocol was implemented and found that
employers arbitrating based on personnel handbook violations were less successful
after the protocol was used than they were before the protocol).
446 See SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT,
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relied on referrals from the carriers in much the same manner that
NAF's arbitrators played this role and relied on NAF.
However, there are also significant differences between
Schweiker and NAF. Unlike the hearing officers in Schweiker, NAFs
arbitrators did not reject half of the claims brought by credit-card
companies against consumers. Instead, NAF's arbitrators found for
the credit-card companies nearly 95% of the time." 7 Admittedly, this
is not significantly different from the fate of collection actions in
court. It is, however, a higher percentage than the Searle Civil Justice
Institute reported for the AAA's arbitration of consumer disputes
brought by businesses." 8 And, of course, Professor Bartholet
received no additional referrals after she decided against one creditcard company and awarded $48,000 to a consumer. Further, unlike
the situation in Schweiker, Congress did not direct the credit-card
companies to insert mandatory arbitration clauses in their boilerplate
contracts or establish requirements for arbitrators. This was entirely
the work of private actors - the credit-card companies and NAF.
Finally and perhaps most compelling are the public identity of the
defendant in Schweiker and the public interest served by Health and
Human Services' careful stewardship of its resources. These are
related factors. The real defendant in Schweiker was a public agency,
not a private insurance carrier - or a private credit-card company or
private ADR provider. The Court found that Health and Human
Services had no inappropriate pecuniary interest. As in Mathews, this
was a federal agency committed to serving its mission - providing
coverage under Part B - while also ensuring the appropriate use of
taxpayers' dollars. The insurance carriers were not themselves
defendants; they were merely agents for the public agency and thus
came within the public mantle. In contrast, if the Minnesota
complaint's allegations are accepted as true, it is easy to conclude that
the web of private actors involved in the NAF case - Accretive,
Agora, Forthright, NAF, Mann Bracken, and Axiant - were not
motivated by a public interest but by a shared pecuniary interest in
ensuring that consumer arbitration assisted the debt collection

447

See

PUBLIC CITIZEN,

supra note 142, at 2.
supra note 38, at xiii.

4" SEARLE ARBITRATION REPORT,
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process and the production of profits for all of the investors
associated with that process." 9
If we consider the jurisprudence upon which Capertonstands, I
believe that NAF could be found in violation of the Due Process
Clause directly or of the constitutional principles animating the
Clause, imported into our understanding of the Federal Arbitration
Act.
V. CONCLUSION

The field of dispute resolution is at a crucial point in its
evolution. With its institutionalization in the courts, agencies, and the
private sector, ADR now is a sufficiently profitable business to
attract the attention of those who will wish to exploit it. As
illustrated, under very narrow circumstances, which may not exist
any longer as credit-card companies hurry to change their boilerplate
contracts and policies in the aftermath of the NAF settlement, the
Constitution may be available to protect the field from others' - or its
own - worst excesses.

But do ADR advocates need to wait for such a catastrophe to
occur? ADR has so much promise. Arbitration, which has been the
focus of this Article, is a process that responds to the real needs of
real people. Now is the time to embrace appropriate and rigorous
regulation to help protect the best of arbitration and avoid the
occurrence of the worst.
There are several options. The stories of Elizabeth Bartholet and
many other NAF arbitrators suggest that self-regulation may work,
particularly if the institutional framework of dispute resolution
organizations is generally sound. But the story of NAF also suggests
that we cannot presume the existence of sound structures. And then,
individual arbitrators will need support. It can be very difficult to
stand firm when one is surrounded by people and a structure that
urges exchange of the lonely virtues of integrity and impartiality for
the exciting drumbeat of status, fame, and (perhaps) lots of money.
The story of NAF, Accretive/Agora, Mann Bracken -joined by the
stories of Enron and Wall Street financiers involved in the bundling
9 Jean R. Sternlight, CreepingMandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 1631, 1647, 1655 (2005) (examining the replacement of public courts with
private arbitral bodies and considering practices in other countries).
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and sale of subprime mortgages, etc. - counsel skepticism and some
form of external accountability. Models exist. On one hand, there is
the market - if there truly is easy entry into the market, real
competition involving a sufficient number of competitors, and equal
access to relevant and understandable information. 45 0 On the other
hand - or perhaps even to assist the operation of the market 4 51 - there
is public regulation. California's disclosure requirements triggered
many of the revelations discussed in this Article.4 52 In Australia, law

See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization,Publicization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 129-30 (2005);
Park, supra note 42, at 129 n.218.
If the loser in such a system [in which the arbitral institution is
dominated by a single industry and nominates arbitrators who
reappointment and thus compensation indirectly depends on the
satisfaction given to the industry] is a large corporation with access to
counsel, an award based on an unjust process would normally result in a
motion for vacatur, as well as damage to the reputation of the arbitrator
and the supervisory institution. The prospect of such checks and balances
seems less likely if the loser is a low-paid employee who finds it difficult
to muster resources for a challenge or a publicity campaign.
Id.; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy andDispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration,67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 300-01 (2004) (identifying
difficulties with the argument that the market offers sufficient accountability).
451 This sort of entanglement could also have the effect of transforming private
arbitral providers into state actors and thus result in direct application of the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Cole, Fairnessin Securities Arbitration,supra note 232,
at 83-97.
450

452

See also CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS INTHE
PRACTICE OF ADR, CPR PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 9-11

(2002). These principles provide the following disclosure requirements:
ADR Provider Organizations should take all reasonable steps to
provide clear, accurate and understandable information about the
following aspects of their services and operations:
a. The nature of the ADR Provider Organization's services, operations, and
fees;
b. The relevant economic, legal, professional or other relationships
between the ADR Provider Organization and its affiliated neutrals;
c. The ADR Provider Organization's policies relating to
confidentiality, organizational and individual conflicts of interests, and
ethical standards for neutrals and the Organization;
d. Training and qualifications requirements for neutrals affiliated with
the Organization, as well as other selection criteria for affiliation; and
e. The method by which neutrals are selected for service....
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firms are now required by the government to have internal systems of
checks and balances, and the number of complaints against lawyers
there has plummeted by 40%. Efforts are afoot in the U.S.,

f. The ADR Provider Organization should disclose the existence of
any interests or relationships which are reasonably likely to affect the
impartiality or independence of the Organization or which might
reasonably create the appearance that the Organization is biased against a
party or favorable to another, including
(i) any financial or other interest by the Organization in the outcome;
(ii) any significant financial, business, organizational, professional or
other relationship that the Organization has with any of the parties or their
counsel, including a contractual stream of referrals, a de facto stream of
referrals, or a funding relationship between a party and the organization;
or
(iii) any other significant source of bias or prejudice concerning the
Organization which is reasonably likely to affect impartiality or might
reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias.
Id. The Georgetown CPR Principles have not been cited in any court opinions.
4' Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation-Respondingto
a ChangingLegal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 510-14 (2009)
(reporting on empirical studies showing increased ethical management and a
reduction in complaints against Australian lawyers/firms after firms put selfassessment tools into place); Laurel Terry, Nat'l Ass'n of Bar Counsel, A Modest
Proposal (Aug. 9, 2008), available at
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/1st3/presentations%20for%20webpage/nob
c%20a%20modest%20proposal.pdf (regarding firm self-assessment tools-appropriate management systemsi-that are currently available); Cf JERRY L.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 222 (1983) (discussing internal controls as a sound method of producing

administrative accuracy). See also Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly
Stronger Casefor the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program:The FDR
Precedent,60 STAN. L. REv. 1023, 1072-73 (2008)

In other work, one of us has outlined a variety of concrete
mechanisms that can help build an institutional apparatus, and culture, of
internal checks and balances. Some of those mechanisms center on the
need to change the architecture of the federal bureaucracy-create
institutional friction and to play upon it. Just as government can function
better when the Departments of State and Defense have overlapping
mandates and resulting tensions, so, too, it might be the case that rivalries
can be exploited through other agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security and the Justice Department. Instead of the standard
separation of powers-whereby Congress checks the President, and the
courts check both-the bureaucracy itself can be structured to create
internal checks. ... Some reforms involve changes within individual
agencies themselves. Vibrant civil service protections are often necessary
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meanwhile, to engage law firms more directly in ensuring ethical
practice,4 5 4 while insurers may be using financial incentives to
encourage their insureds to increase the accuracy of their awards and
reduce conflicts of interest.4 5 S
A somewhat less direct means of encouraging institutions to
establish internal controls to assist their individual arbitrators would
be to abandon deferential judicial review when there has been a
sufficient showing that: (1) an outcome has been produced by an
embedded neutral; (2) the situation involved a contest between a
powerful institutional repeat player and a less-powerful institutional
or individual one-time player;456 (3) the more powerful repeat-player

so that employees feel they can do their job without reprisal. Agencies
might consider borrowing here from the foreign service, where
longstanding policies create the conditions for a bureaucracy that is,
comparatively speaking, focused on long-term horizons and the
development of balanced policy. Indeed, the State Department has explicit
procedures in place that permit foreign service officers to dissent and warn
Washington of actions they feel are problematic in the field. The Foreign
Service Officer who uses this so-called 'dissent channel' in the most
productive way each year wins an award.
Id.
454 See, for example, the debates over the ethical obligations of law firms as
currently described in Rule 5.1. Professor Ted Schneyer has urged the need to
discipline law firms, not just individual lawyers. Ted Schneyer, Professional
DisciplineofLaw Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13 (1992). This led to proposed
revisions to Rule 8.4 in Ethics 2000.
455 See Leo Herzel & Dale E. Colling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of
Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73, 114 (1978) (recommending interdepartmental
information walls to reduce bank conflicts); Brief for Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at * 15, Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008) (No. 06-923), 2008 WL 596062 (suggesting
that insurers have incentives to reward claims processors for their accuracy).
456 Distinguishing between repeat players and one-time players will be
difficult, but we can look to other areas of law for guidance. See, e.g., Vorsheck v.
Comm'r, 933 F.2d 757, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1991) (differential application of tax law
to non-sophisticated couple); Heasley v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 380, 381, 385 (5th Cir.
1990) (waiving penalty for couple with no advanced business experience that relied
on financial advisor in investing in tax shelter); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Cent. Bank
of Monroe, 838 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir. 1988) (taking notice of line of cases that
held consumers to different standard than businesses in certain situations if court
found that strict adherence to contract term would produce overly harsh results); In
re Garza, No. 95-6037, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1810 at *4647 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. July
22, 2005) (businessmen presumed to know the harm that will result from
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selected the individual embedded neutral or the dispute resolution
organization which employed or contracted with the individual
neutral; and (4) the more powerful repeat-player institution failed to
establish any meaningful structural counterbalances.4 5 7 Certainly
there are other models that could be explored.45 8
conversion of secured party's collateral); In re Khanani, No. 6:04-bk-07648-ABB,
2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1876, at *21 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2005) (experienced
business held to higher standard of care). But see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597-98 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing outrage at
enforcement of forum selection clause against elderly couple who resided in
Washington but were forced by terms of purchase-which they did not even see
until after making purchase-to litigate in Florida); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 488-90 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (worrying that
decision will result in personal jurisdiction over unsophisticated individuals who
enter into contracts with sophisticated businesses); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465, 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (presuming that repeat-player
plaintiffs lawyers will police ranks of arbitrators and noting interestingly that "wise
employers and their representatives should see no benefit in currying the favor of
corrupt arbitrators, because this simply will invite increased judicial review of
arbitral judgments"); Rubino v. Circuit City Stores, 758 N.E.2d 1, 16 n.3 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (referencing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
to aid unsophisticated consumer); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, PrivateLaw, Public
"Justice":Another Look at Privacy, Arbitration,and GlobalE-Commerce, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 769, 782 (2000).
457 This approach has been used in other contexts, such as trust law. See, e.g.,
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008).
The conflict of interest at issue here . .. should prove more important
(perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher
likelihood that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited
to, cases where an insurance company administrator has a history of
biased claims administration. It should prove less important (perhaps to
the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to
reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off
claims administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by
imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking
irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.
Id.; Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987) ("When the members of the tribunal-for example, the
trustees of a pension plan-have a serious conflict of interest, the proper deference
to give their decision may be slight, even zero.. . . There may be in effect a sliding
scale ofjudicial review of trustees' decisions more penetrating the greater is the
suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is."); see also
Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 317,
328-29 (2009) (noting that appellate review reduces error and increases the quality
of decision-making); Stempel, MandatingMinimum Quality, supra note 28, at
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The story of NAF is a wake-up call. Will we rise up and do what
it takes to reform - and thus protect the integrity of - these

"alternative" processes and neutrals? Or will we hit the snooze button
one more time and pull those covers back over our faces, returning to
our cozy dream of a world of "no possessions ... no need for greed
or hunger, [a] brotherhood of man" 459? That is a beautiful, alluring
dream.460 But it seems that every utopia that has been created on this
earth has the potential to degenerate into a dystopic nightmare.
Instead, let's dream a more realistic dream of checks and balances throwing off our covers and bracing for both the frightening
exhilaration and hard work of the struggle that is the real world.

428-31 (proposing imposition of same standards ofjudicial review that are
imposed upon trial courts-e.g., clearly erroneous for challenges to fact-finding;
abuse of discretion for exercises of judicial discretion; de novo for application of
law). But see Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation ofFairnessin
SecuritiesArbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 517-18 (2008) (asserting that
judicial review is not effective to ensure fairness in arbitration, but SEC oversight
is effective).
458 They include: offering "alternative" dispute resolution only through
independent, financially stable entities-perhaps public, perhaps the joint venture
of normally competing entities; revising the standard that a neutral must use when
deciding whether to recuse herself in response to a party's objection (using 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) as a model); revising the procedure to be used when a party seeks a
neutral's recusal; revising the standard used by courts for vacatur based on
partiality; ending quasi-judicial immunity or conditioning the grant of such
immunity upon sufficient appearance of impartiality; permitting parties to "strike"
a neutral if there is even an appearance of bias; requiring court-connected neutrals
to take the judge's oath to uphold justice; developing and funding effective
monitoring and evaluation of neutrals; professionalizing neutrals, so that they share
norms, values, and an understanding of best practice; establishing independent
dispute resolution regulatory bodies; providing for rescission of mediated
agreements within a limited time period or upon a prima facie showing of the
appearance of partiality; and providing for a change of burden of proof regarding
existence/importance of conflict of interest upon prima facie showing of
appearance of partiality.
459 JOHN LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971).
41 Although not exactly gender inclusive.
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